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Bankruptcy
LEONARD H. GILBERT* AND ROBERT PASS**
The authors survey the significant developments in bank-
ruptcy, with particular emphasis on state and federal decisions
important to the Florida practitioner. Areas of analysis include
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court, the rights of secured parties
and other claimants, procedure and discharges. Throughout the
article the authors make reference to pertinent decisions involv-
ing the Florida Uniform Commercial Code.
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BANKRUPTCY
I. INTRODUCTION
This article surveys the 1978 decisions of the bankruptcy courts
sitting in Florida and certain decisions of the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals and Supreme Court of the ,United States.' No attempt is
made to discuss all decisions. Generally, cases are included which
significantly add to or subtract from the law, though some that
merely restate the law are examined on the premise that, in some
areas, it is useful to know that traditional principles continue. It
should be noted that because most decisions of the bankruptcy
courts sitting in Florida are not reported, this article discusses the
facts of the cases surveyed to a greater degree than would otherwise
be necessary.2
II. JURISDICTION OF THE BANKRUPTCY COURT
The summary jurisdiction of a bankruptcy court is limited to
adjudicating rights and claims to property in the actual or construc-
tive possession of the bankruptcy court.3 When a controversy in-
volves property in the actual or constructive possession of a third
person who does not consent to the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction,
the action must be brought in some other court.' Unlike virtually
every other kind of court, the party holding property over which the
bankruptcy court would not otherwise have jurisdiction can confer
jurisdiction on the bankruptcy court by consent or waiver.' Several
interesting questions arose during 1978 concerning the jurisdiction
of the bankruptcy court, and are reviewed below.
A. State Proceedings
The Bankruptcy Act excludes savings and loan associations
(S&L) from its scope.6 In In re Bankers Trust Co.,7 the Court of
1. For earlier developments, see Gilbert & Pass, Bankruptcy, 1977 Developments in
Florida Law, 32 U. MIAMn L. REv. 781 (1978); Gilbert & Pass, Bankruptcy, 1976 Developments
in Florida Law, 31 U. MtAMI L. REv. 791 (1977).
2. The Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1103 (1970), is referred to in this article as the
"Act." A cross reference table correlating references to the Act with the United States Code
appears at 11 U.S.C.A. xiv (1973).
3. See Herbert v. Crawford, 228 U.S. 204 (1913). For a detailed discussion of summary
jurisdiction, see Suskin & Swing, Ownership as a Basis for Survey Jurisdiction in Chapter
XI Arrangements, 31 U. MIAMI L. REv. 307 (1977).
4. Harrison v. Chamberlin, 271 U.S. 191 (1926). Jan C. Uiterwyk Co. v. Brock, 500 F.2d
390 (5th Cir. 1974).
5. 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 23.08 (14th ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as COLLIER].
6. Section 4 of the Act excludes "building and loan associations" from access to the
bankruptcy court as a voluntary or involuntary bankrupt or debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 22 (1970).
7. 566 F.2d 1281 (5th Cir. 1978).
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Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that this exclusion prevented the
bankruptcy court from interfering in a state S&L reorganization,
even though the S&L was wholly owned by, and was the major asset
of, a parent corporation subject to the bankruptcy court's jurisdic-
tion in a chapter X reorganization. The subsidiary S&L, which was
the debtor's major asset, was itself in a state court conservatorship.
The bankruptcy court enjoined the state proceeding, declaring that
the parent corporation's creditors had a right to protection equal to
the right of the subsidiary. The question was one of jurisdiction:
whether the bankrupcy court's exclusive jurisdiction over the bank-
rupt's property' could reach such state proceedings involving the
wholly owned subsidiary. Section 511 provides that the court in
which a reorganization petition is filed has "exclusive jurisdiction
of the debtor and its property, wherever located." The bankruptcy
court based its jurisdiction over the subsidiary on the theory that it
had jurisdiction over the stock of the subsidiary (an asset of the
reorganization debtor), even though the subsidiary was not itself
before the bankruptcy court. The Fifth Circuit disagreed and held
that such an exercise of jurisdiction was simply inconsistent with
the provisions of the Act that exclude S&L's from its scope. S&L
reorganizations must be conducted under state rather than federal
law.
B. Post Petition Debts
Section 2a of the Act gives the bankruptcy court jurisdiction to
"[h]ear and determine . . . any question arising as to the amount
or legality of any unpaid tax. . . . .10 In In re W. C. Donald Crane
Service Inc.," the bankruptcy court held that section 2a gave it
summary jurisdiction over post petition federal tax debts, even
though the court's jurisdiction does not normally reach post petition
debts. 2 The court also held that section 2a gave it jurisdiction over
the federal tax claim, regardless of whether or not the IRS filed it.'
3
8. Section 511 of the Act grants the reorganization court "exclusive jurisdiction of the
debtor and its property, wherever located" for the purposes of the reorganization. See In re
Stanndco Developers, Inc., 534 F.2d 1050 (2d Cir. 1976). The jurisdiction of the court over
the property of the debtor does not depend on the debtor's title to the property. In re
Fontainebleau Hotel Corp., 508 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1975). The reorganization jurisdiction of
the court, however, is no greater than that for "straight" bankruptcy proceedings. See Nytco
Servs., Inc. v. Hurley's Grain Elevator Co., 422 F. Supp. 114 (W.D. Tenn. 1976).
9. 566 F.2d at 1287 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 511).
10. 11 U.S.C. § 11(2)(A) (emphasis added).
11. No. 73-82 (M.D. Fla., filed Apr. 11, 1978).
12. Id., slip op. at 2.
13. See In re Aoland, 1 B.C.D. 1057 (9th Cir. f957).
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C. As Affected by Appeal
In In re Georgetown Apartments, 1 the court held that an appeal
of its denial of confirmation in a chapter* XII proceeding did not
deprive it of jurisdiction over the debtor's property, and therefore
the court could order funds of the estate to be spent. The debtor'
contended that, because an appeal was pending, the bankruptcy
court lacked jurisdiction over the fund, and that any application to
require the payment of real estate taxes from the estate must be
addressed to the district court. The basis of the district court's
decision was that regardless of how the appeal was resolved, the
bankruptcy court had jurisdiction over the debtor's property. 5
D. Leasehold Interest of Debtor
In In re Dutch Inn of Orlando, Ltd.,"5 the court considered a
jurisdictional question concerning the ill-defined concept of
"property of the bankrupt." The case was an adversary proceeding
between two creditors. The plaintiff-creditor had a mortgage lien
on the debtor's leasehold interest in real estate leased from the other
creditor, who was the lessor. The first creditor claimed its mortgage
lien encumbered the fee of the lessor. The court held that the only
"property of the bankrupt" was the leasehold, and that jurisdiction
over the leasehold does not confer jurisdiction over a controversy
between two creditors concerning the fee. The court relied on the
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Callaway v.
Benton, 1 in which the Court observed that, while the debtor's lease-
hold interest was "property" within the meaning of the Act, the
reversion in fee held by a creditor was not. To the same effect is the
decision of the Fifth Circuit in Texas & New Orleans Railroad v.
Phillips. 11
There are exceptions to this rule, such as where the results of
the litigation between third parties would affect the estate of the
bankrupt, and where it is impossible to administer the estate com-
pletely without determining the collateral controversy."9 The court,
however, found none of those exceptions applicable. In those cases
14. No. 76-648 (M.D. Fla., filed Apr. 28, 1978).
15. See In re Rubicon, Ltd., 331 F. Supp. 1307 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
16. No. 77-395 (M.D. Fla., filed Jan. 11, 1978).
17. 336 U.S. 132 (1949).
18. 211 F.2d 419 (5th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 913 (1955). See also In re Holiday
Lodge, Inc., 300 F.2d 516 (7th Cir. 1962).
19. See e.g., In re Pioneer Oil & Gas Co., 279 F. Supp. 242 (E.D. La. 1968). See also
O'Dell v. United States, 326 F.2d 451 (10th Cir. 1964); In re Equity Funding Corp. of America,
396 F. Supp. 1266 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
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the injunction was directed at property of the debtor in which the
debtor had substantial equity that the reorganization court was
bound to protect. In contrast, the court believed the instant litiga-
tion had merely a "peripheral" effect on the debtor's estate, because
its purpose was only to determine whether the debtor's lien encum-
bered the fee of another.
E. Consent to Jurisdiction
In In re Troyan,2 ° the court held that the IRS was bound by a
judgment rendered in an adversary proceeding in which the IRS
participated, without objecting to the court's jurisdiction, while
purporting to "reserve" its right to assert any jurisdictional defen-
ses. The "reservation" was ineffective. The court held that, by fail-
ing to pursue the objection, the IRS "consented" to its jurisdiction
and was thereby bound by res judicata.2 '
F. Converted Cash
In In re North American Marketing Corp., 12 both the debtor and
the receiver sued a third party to recover cash fraudulently con-
verted prior to bankruptcy. The third party successfully argued that
the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction because: (1) the cause of
action did not fall within any area over which the Act expressly
confers summary jurisdiction;"3 (2) there was no contention that the
defendant had voluntarily consented to the summary jurisdiction;
and, (3) the action did not involve property in the actual or con-
structive possession of the bankruptcy court.
The court held that while it had summary jurisdiction to deter-
mine the ownership of conflicting claims to the money, it lacked
jurisdiction to enforce its determination. The court also rejected the
argument that it had jurisdiction because the defendant's defense
20. No. 76-726 (S.D. Fla., filed Sept. 9, 1978).
21. See Chicot County Draingage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 376-77
(1940).
22. No. 77-1157 (S.D. Fla., filed Aug. 16, 1978).
23. Id. slip op. at 2. Those areas are: (1) proceedings by the trustee or debtor to deter-
mine the validity of a lien obtained by attachment, judgment or levy within four months of
petition under the Act (§ 67a(4), 11 U.S.C. § 107); (2) to require receivers or trustees and
others to take possession of or liquidate property and to deliver it to the receiver or trustee
where a plan arrangement has been confirmed (§ 2a(21), 11 U.S.C. § 11; (3) to order the
return of money paid in contemplation of the filing of the petition by the bankrupt to an
attorney at law for legal services rendered in contemplation of bankruptcy (§ 60d; 11 U.S.C.
§ 96); and, (4) determination of the damages in the event of a breach of any obligation on a
bond furnished under the Act (§ 50n, 11 U.S.C. § 78).
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was "merely colorable." '24 That basis for summary jurisdiction exists
only where a defendant is in possession of property claimed to be
that of the debtor or bankrupt, under an adverse claim that is with-
out substance. As such, the defense was not available in the North
American situation.
G. Consent by Filing a Claim
In In re Norsesian, 15 a landlord sought a declaratory decree that
the debtor had breached its lease, so that the automatic stay im-
posed by rule 11-44 could be modified to allow eviction. The debtor
counterclaimed for breach of the lease. The court held that the
plaintiff did not submit itself to the court's jurisdiction concerning
counterclaims on the lease by seeking a modification of the stay.'
The lessor did not confer jurisdiction on the bankruptcy court to
consider counterclaims by filing a proof of claim either, because
determination of the counterclaim was not "indispensable" to the
determination of the main claim. 7
Ill. EXEMPTIONS
A bankruptcy court has no jurisdiction over property that is
exempt from the claims of creditors under state law.28 Title to such
property does not pass to the trustee .2 The Act provides that the
exemption laws of the states must be applied and therefore creditors
who claim that certain property is not exempt must turn to the state
courts to obtain satisfaction for their debts.
24. See In re Middletown Packing Co., 199 F. Supp. 657 (D. Conn. 1961). See also
Harrison v. Chamberlin, 271 U.S. 191, 194 (1926); Louisville Trust Co. v. Comingor, 184 U.S.
18 (1902); In re Meiselman, 105 F.2d 995, 998 (2d Cir. 1939) (claimant cannot avoid summary
order "by the very audacity of his claims .... The referee must proceed to determine
whether the adverse claim is 'plainly without color of merit in the mere pretense' .
25. No. 77-446 (N.D. Fla., filed Mar. 28, 1978).
26. See In re Groundhog Mountain Corp., 1 B.C.D. 923 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); In re Essex
Properties Ltd., 12 C.B.C. 201 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
27. See In re Behring & Behring, 445 F.2d 1096 (5th Cir. 1971).
28. Although the bankruptcy court has jurisdiction to determine whether property is
exempt under state law, In re Jackson, 472 F.2d 589 (9th Cir. 1973), once the court has
determined that property is exempt, it loses jurisdiction over that property. Browne v. San
Luis Obispo Nat'l Bank, 462 F.2d 129 (9th Cir. 1972). Whether the property is exempt is
determined on the basis of conditions existing when the bankruptcy petition is filed. Love v.
Menick, 341 F.2d 680 (9th Cir. 1965).
29. Harris v. Hoffman, 379 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1967); In re Smith, 366 F. Supp. 1213 (D.
Idaho 1973).
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A. State Real Property
In Dade County Taxing Authorities v. Cedars of Lebanon Hos-
pital Corp.,N the Supreme Court of Florida advised the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit that real property designed and in-
tended for an exempt purpose, but which has not yet been used for
such, is not exempt from taxation. All parties agreed that the
hospital-debtor was entitled to the Florida ad valorem real property
tax exemption, but disagreed on whether the hospital's "Care Cen-
ter" was similarly entitled. The Care Center was admittedly de-
signed and intended to be used for an exempt purpose, but it had
not been actually used for anything on the day tax exemptions were
determined.
The Fifth Circuit certified the question of the Care Center's tax
exempt status to the Supreme Court of Florida, which answered
that the intended use of the property was irrelevant. Only the actual
use of the property as of January 1 of each tax year governs an
entity's entitlement to tax-exempt status.3 The court noted that
Florida's statutory exemption provides an exemption only for prop-
erty "used" in an exempt manner.2
B. Homestead: Homosexual "Head of Household"
In In re Merwin, 3 the court held that the Florida homestead tax
exemption does not extend to include a purely homosexual
"household." The bankrupt was engaged in homosexual cohabita-
tion with another man, whom the bankrupt supported and with
whose property that of the bankrupt was commingled. The bank-
rupt claimed the constitutionally provided homestead exemption34
as "the head of a family," a claim which the trustee disputed.
In an apparent case of first impression, the court noted that
while the meaning of "family" is not defined by the Constitution of
the State of Florida, decisions construing it have uniformly held
that the "family must be composed of two or more persons having
some type of common relationship and normally joined by ties of
30. 355 So. 2d 1202 (Fla. 1978); In re Cedars of Lebanon Hosp. Corp., 546 F.2d 63 (5th
Cir. 1977).
31. In so determining the court relied on its prior decision in Lake Worth Towers Inc. v.
Gerstung, 262 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1972). There, the court enunciated the "actual use" doctrine and
found that a nonprofit home for the aged did not qualify for tax exemption because the
building was not being used as such on the date when the taxable status for the year was
determined.
32. See FLA. STAT. § 196.012, .192, .195-.197 (1977).
33. No. 77-745 (M.D. Fla., filed Mar. 7, 1978).
34. See FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4.
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blood or marriage."3 5 As support for its decision, the court noted
that in 1977 the Florida Legislature limited the adoption and mar-
riage rights of homosexuals," and in 1976 specifically declared that
it intended to insure that the homestead exemption would inure to
the benefit of a surviving member of a tenancy by the entireties, i.e.,
the spouse. 37 In so observing, the court made no suggestion that the
legislature could not grant the homestead exemption to homosexual
relationships, but concluded that it was not the intent of the legisla-
ture to do 80.38
IV. AuToMATic STAY
When a petition is filed under the Act, rule 401(a) creates an
"automatic" stay against the institution or continuation of any ac-
tion against the bankrupt, and against the enforcement of any judg-
ment against him on a dischargeable debt." Rule 601 stays proceed-
ings to enforce liens against property in the custody of the bank-
ruptcy court which were obtained within four months of bankruptcy
by attachment, levy, judgment or other legal or equitable proceed-
ings."0
A. Effect on Pending Litigation
In Willis v. Gladding Corp.," the Fifth Circuit held that rule
11-44(a) does not authorize the dismissal of an action pending
against the bankrupt at the time the petition in bankruptcy is filed.
The court pointed out that a dismissal in such an instance is unnec-
essary to protect the debtor from harrassment, which is the purpose
of the automatic stay." In this regard, its analysis reflected its prior
decision in Baum v. Anderson.3 The court found that it was no
answer that title 11, section 791 of the United States Code suspends
all statutes of limitations affecting claims provable under chapter
XI during the pendency of the proceeding," largely because a dis-
35. In re Merwin, No. 77-745, slip op. at 5 (M.D. Fla., filed Mar. 7, 1978).
36. See FLA. STAT. §§ 63.042, 741.04 (1977).
37. Id. § 222.19.
38. In re Merwin, No. 77-745, slip op. at 5 (M.D. Fla., filed Mar. 7, 1978).
39. See Bankruptcy Act, Rule 401, 11 U.S.C. Rule 401 (Supp. l, 1973).
40. See id. Rule 601, 11 U.S.C. Rule 601 (Supp. 1H, 1973).
41. 567 F.2d 630 (5th Cir. 1978).
42. See Preferred Surfacing, Inc. v. Gwinnett Bank & Trust Co., 400 F. Supp. 280 (N.D.
Ga. 1975).
43. 541 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 932 (1977). See e.g., David v.
Hooker, Ltd., 560 F.2d 412 (9th Cir. 1977).
44. The purpose of the tolling statute is to allow unfettered consideration of the plan of
reorganization and to suspend the running of time on plans so that the rights of creditors to
19791
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missal would cause a plaintiff to lose his place on the court's calen-
dar as well as waste a great deal of procedural and motion work
already completed.
B. Modification to Permit Foreclosure
The stay can be vacated or modified by the bankruptcy court,45
though the creditor seeking a modification must file a complaint
instituting an adversary proceeding. Injunctive protection, however,
is normally afforded the debtor on a showing that: (1) there is sub-
stantial equity in the property involved; (2) the collateral is not in
jeopardy; (3) the property is indispensable to a successful arrange-
ment; (4) there is a real possibility that the debtor will not be able
to effectuate an arrangement; and (5) meaningful steps have been
made to refinance secured debts." In In re Jacobsen J-J Ranch,
Inc., 7 the court held that the possible success of speculative invest-
ments by the debtor was not a reason sufficient to prevent modifica-
tion of the stay so as to permit foreclosure. A secured creditor sought
modification of the stay to foreclose on certain collateral. The debtor
opposed the request on the ground that, if a number of speculative
financing and entrepreneurial schemes bore fruit, the debtor would
be able to pay off the secured creditors.
The court granted the modification, observing that the debtor
had no substantial equity in the property and that there was no real
possibility of effectuating the arrangment. The court urged that the
debtor make "peace" with his secured creditors, since chapter XI
was designed to enable financially embarrassed debtors to settle
their unsecured debts, and not to alter or modify the rights of se-
cured creditors." The court observed that chapter XI is not a
an equal share of the bankrupt's estate are protected. Liman v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 337 F.
Supp. 62 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
45. Rule 401(d) provides that the court may "terminate, annul, modify, or condition
such [automatic] stay." Rule 601(c) has a similar provision. See notes 37 and 38 supra.
46. See generally In re Jacobsen J-J Ranch, Inc., No. 77-271 (M.D. Fla., filed on Mar.
6, 1978). In re Tracy, 194 F. Supp. 293 (N.D. Cal. 1961); In re Haines Lumber & Millwork
Co., 144 F. Supp. 108 (E.D. Pa. 1956).
47. No. 77-271 (M.D. Fla., filed on Mar. 6, 1978).
48. It has been said that the central purpose of an arrangement is to "secure judicial
confirmation to an arrangement, or adjustment, of the debtor's unsecured obligations." FEC
v. American Trailer Rentals, 379 U.S. 594, 605 (1965); FEC v. U.S. Realty & Improvement
Co., 310 U.S. 434, 445 (1940). Section 356 of the Act, which governs the contents of an
arrangement, requires a plan to include provisions modifying or altering only the rights of
unsecured creditors. The rights of secured creditors are not part of the plan. It has been said
that "[nlo provision of the Act permits an arrangement proposed under Chapter XI to deal
with the rights of secured creditors .... "In re Texas Consumer Fin. Corp., 480 F.2d 1261,
1265 (5th Cir. 1973) (construing 9 CoLIER 8.01[3], at 168).
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"panacea for headaches of the debtors"" caused by problems with
secured creditors, and that the debtor could not take shelter under
the protective umbrella of chapter XI regardless of the sincerity of
its efforts to consummate an arrangement with its unsecured credi-
tors.5
C. Modification to Permit Eviction
Section 70b of the Act permits the enforcement of lease provi-
sions that terminate a lease when the lessee files in bankruptcy.5 1
In the realm of reorganizations, however, the statute has failed to
obviate completely the common law disfavor of forfeitures.52 In addi-
tion, the courts have generally been disinclined to enforce forfeiture
provisions where enforcement would substantially impair rehabili-
tation of the debtor or would deprive the bankrupt estate of its
principal asset.5" On occasion, courts have circumvented section 70b
by concluding that a landlord had waived his right to enforce the
forfeiture or by otherwise interpreting state law in avoidance of the
bankruptcy issue. u
A chapter XI proceeding is a proper forum for the exercise of
the court's equitable discretion to prevent terminations under such
default provisions.55 Those equitable powers are forcefully employed
when the lessee is current in his rent, when he has not impaired the
Generally speaking, a secured creditor has several options not available to the unsecured
creditor. He may disregard the arrangement altogether, file no claim and rely on his security.
He may file a secured claim against the estate if the security for the debt is within the
jurisdiction of the court. Finally, he may surrender or waive his security and prove his claim
as an unsecured creditor, or he may avail himself of his security and share in the general
assets as to the unsecured balance. See United States Nat'l Bank v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 331
U.S. 28, 33-34 (1947); In re Pennyrich Int'l, Inc., 473 F.2d 417, 421 (5th Cir. 1973). Therefore,
the secured creditor has the option of staying out of the arrangement or of participating in it
in varying degrees. He cannot be forced to participate. See Gilbert & Pass, Bankruptcy, 1976
Developments in Florida Law, supra note 1, at 803-07.
49. In re Jacobsen J-J Ranch, Inc., No. 77-271, slip op. at 5 (M.D. Fla., filed on Mar. 6,
1978).
50. See In re Chaffee County Fluorspar Corp. v. Athan, 169 F.2d 448 (10th Cir. 1948).
51. This statutory section provides in part that "[an express covenant that . . . the
bankruptcy of a specified party thereto. . . shall terminate the lease or give the other party
an election to terminate the same is enforceable." Bankruptcy Act § 70b, 11 U.S.C. 110.
52. Such provisions are often weighed against the public interest in successful reorgani-
zations. See Smith v. Hoboken R.R. Warehouse & S.S. Connecting Co., 328 U.S. 123 (1946).
53. See Pennsylvania Real Estate Inv. Trust v. Fountainebleau Hotel Corp., 515 F.2d
913 (5th Cir. 1975); Queens Blvd. Wine & Liquor Corp. v. Blum, 503 F.2d 202 (2d Cir. 1974);
In re Fleetwood Motel Corp., 335 F.2d 857 (3rd Cir. 1964).
54. See e.g., Larkins v. Sills, 377 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1967); In re Speare, 360 F.2d 882 (2d
Cir. 1966); Geraghty v. Kiamie Fifth Ave. Corp., 210 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1954).
55. See In re M & M Transp. Co., 437 F. Supp. 821 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); In re D.H. Overmyer
Co., 383 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 510 F.2d 329 (2d Cir. 1975).
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value of the leasehold, when termination would be of little benefit
to the creditor, and when termination would substantially harm the
debtor."
In In re Norsesian,7 the court refused to modify the stay to
permit an eviction where the lease and the leasehold property were
the only assets of the debtors. Plaintiff-lessor sought to evict the
defendants from their leased business property. The plaintiffs
sought a declaratory decree that the lease was breached and for-
feited and for a modification of the stay to allow an eviction action
in state court. The main issue was whether allowing an eviction
action was consistent with the policy of the Act. The debtor con-
tended that an eviction would confer an inequitable advantage on
the plaintiff over other unsecured creditors because the long term
lease and the equipment in the leased property were the only assets
of the debtor ind were therefore indispensable to rehabilitation.
The court held that, despite a lease provision awarding imme-
diate possession to the landlord, chapter 83 of the Florida Statutes
provides the only way to evict. That chapter requires termination
of a lease by a state court. 8 There having been no such court action,
the lessors were not entitled to rely on the termination provisions
of the lease for their remedy.
In addition, the court observed that lease forfeiture provisions
would normally be enforced against a chapter XI debtor, unless
"equitable circumstances" would warrant a refusal. Those equitable
circumstances are: (1) whether the property sought to be forfeited
is the only property of the estate; (2) whether the public interest is
best served by the continued operation of the debtor or by consider-
ation of the number of unsecured creditors; and, (3) whether the
harm to the landlord is minimal in comparison to the harm which
would accrue to the unsecured creditors if the rehabilitation goal is
not achieved." The courts' continued refusal to enforce such lease
forfeiture provisions depends on the progress of the debtor's rehabil-
itation proceeding and a swift confirmation of the plan. Thus, a
56. See In re M & M Transp. Co., 437 F. Supp. at 822-23.
57. No. 77-446 (N.D. Fla., filed on Mar. 28, 1978).
58. Section 83.59 of the Florida Statutes (1977) provides that the landlord may sue in
the county court to dispossess a tenant holding over after the lease is terminated, and section
83.62 provides for the issuance of a writ to the sheriff allowing him to place the landlord in
possession after 24 hours' notice on the tenant. The Act provides for no "self-help" procedures
where the tenant is in possession and refuses to vacate.
59. 515 F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1975); Queens Blvd. Wine & Liquor Corp. v. Blum, 503 F.2d
202 (2d Cir. 1974); Weaver v. Hutson, 459 F.2d 741 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 957
(1972); In re Fleetwood Hotel Corp., 335 F.2d 857 (3d Cir. 1964).
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refusal to enforce a lease termination is continuously subject to
review.
D. Effect on State Disciplinary Proceedings
In In re Fortiner Realty Co.,"0 the court found that the stay did
not reach state administrative disciplinary proceedings that did not
attempt to collect a debt. The bankrupts were real estate brokers.
The Florida Real Estate Commission (FREC), a state agency,
brought disciplinary proceedings against the bankrupts for alleged
violations of state law. The bankrupts claimed protection under the
automatic stay. The FREC argued that the court lacked jurisdiction
over the subject matter.
The court held that bankrupts were not protected by rule 401
or by any other provision of the Act. Distinguishing such cases as
Perez v. Campbell,"' Grimes v. Hoschler2 and Rutledge v. City of
Shreveport,"3 which generally held that state agencies could not
utilize state disciplinary or administrative penalties to coerce pay-
ment of debts, the court found that the FREC was seeking only to
impose disciplinary penalties, and not to enforce the collection of a
debt. The court recognized that a "curtailment of the bankrupt's
right to practice his profession may have a serious and profound
impact on his ability to obtain 'a new opportunity in life and a clear
field for future effort unhampered by the pressure and discourage-
ment of pre-existing debts .. ,"'" but found that when that new
opportunity in life is jeopardized by professional misconduct rather
than the nonpayment of debts, the "interest of the public far out-
weighs the interest which the bankruptcy discharge was designed to
foster and protect." 5
E. Effect on Counterclaims Brought by Debtor
In First Wisconsin National Bank v. Grandlich Development
Corp.," the court held that the stay does not prevent a state court
from dismissing a bankrupt's counterclaim because it does not
reach actions brought by the debtor. The plaintiff bank sued to
60. No. 76-1094 (M.D. Fla., filed on Apr. 10, 1978).
61. 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
62. 180 Cal. Rptr. 230 (Cal. App. 1973). 12 Cal. 3d 305, 525 P.2d 65, 115 Cal. Rptr. 625
(1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 973 (1975).
63. 387 F. Supp. 1277 (W.D. La. 1975).
64. In re Fortiner Realty Co., No. 76-1094, slip op. at 3 (M.D. Fla., filed on Apr. 10, 1978)
(quoting Lines v. Frederick, 400 U.S. 18, 19 (1970)).
65. Id., slip op. at 3.
66. 565 F.2d 879 (5th Cir. 1978).
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foreclose certain mortgages, and the defendants counterclaimed for
usury. They then filed in bankruptcy. Noting that the bankruptcy
petition stayed the foreclosure, the district court dismissed the
bankrupts from the foreclosure proceedings, thereby effectively dis-
missing their counterclaim.
On appeal, the bankrupts argued that the filing of the bank-
ruptcy petition deprived the district court of jurisdiction to dismiss
their counterclaim. The Fifth Circuit disagreed, pointing out that
the rule operates only to stay proceedings against the debtor. Be-
cause the counterclaim was not against the debtors, it was in no way
affected by the automatic stay.
V. HOLDERS OF SECURITY INTERESTS
A. "Floating Secured Parties"
Section 9-402 of the Uniform Commercial Code requires that
"the secured party" be named in the financing statement.67 Section
9-405 provides a means of assigning a security interest of record. 8
Under section 9-302(2), an assignee need not file a notice of assign-
ment in order to maintain the perfected nature of a security interest
against the debtor's creditor; however, he must file a notice of as-
signment in order to maintain that perfectio against creditors of
the assignor. 1
In In re E. A. Fretz Co.,7 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit held that the UCC does not authorize "floating secured
parties." The bankrupt executed three security agreements giving
Revlon a security interest in certain collateral for any debts owed
to Revlon and Revlon's present or future affiliates or subsidiaries.
The bankrupt later gave a bank a security interest in the same
collateral. At the time of the Revlon agreement, two Revlon subsidi-
aries were unsecured creditors of the debtor. After bankruptcy, the
two subsidiaries assigned their interests to Revlon, who then
67. Section 679.402(1)(a) of the Florida Statutes (1977) provides in part that "[a] fi-
nancing statement is sufficient if it is signed by the debtor and the secured party, [and] gives
an address of the secured party from which information concerning the security interest may
be obtained."
68. Section 679.405 of the Florida Statutes (1977) provides in part that a financing
statement may disclose an assignment of a security interest by indicating in the financing
statement the name and address of the assignee or by filing the assignment itself, or by filing
a separate written statement of assignment setting forth the name of the secured party of
record and the name and address of the assignee. After filing the assignment or the disclosure
of the assignment, the assignee becomes a secured party of record. See Gilbert & Pass,
Bankruptcy, 1976 Developments in Florida Law, supra note 1, at 794-97.
69. FLA. STAT. § 679.302 (1977).
70. 565 F.2d 366 (5th Cir. 1978).
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claimed to have a security interest to the extent of the combined
debt. Reversing the bankruptcy judge, the Fifth Circuit held that
Revlon did not become a secured creditor to the extent of the as-
signed interests. The argument of the parent corporation that the
original financing statement satisfied section 9-402 by giving notice
that the secured party of record (Revlon) may have a security inter-
est in the collateral sufficient to enable a prudent examiner to deter-
mine the exact state of affairs failed.
The court held that the subsidiaries were never "secured par-
ties" themselves, because they were not named in the Revlon secu-
rity agreement. The subsidiaries were not signatories to the financ-
ing statement, nor were their addresses on it, so the perfection re-
quirments of section 9-402 were unsatisfied. Even assuming the sub-
sidiaries held a perfectable security interest, the court still decided
that perfection should have been accomplished by filing either the
original financing statement or the post-bankruptcy assignment.
The court noted that, "in a world of huge conglomerates," the
creation of floating secured parties is at odds with the "simple no-
tice" requirement of section 9-402, and that to approve "floating"
secured parties would undercut the perfection requirements of arti-
cle 9."1 In the court's view the fact that the bankrupt knew of the
subsidiary's interest made no difference.
The court reasoned that the consequences of any other decision
would be dangerous. Priority in bankruptcy is determined on the
date of bankruptcy. At that time, neither subsidiary had assigned
its claim to the parent. As a result, post-bankruptcy acts would have
effectively created the security agreement, in complete contraven-
tion of the bankruptcy "cleavage rule" and the intent of the Act to
achieve an equitable distribution of assets.
B. Proceeds
In In re T. C. Brown & Associates, Inc.,72 the court rejected the
novel argument that a security interest in inventory proceeds gave
the creditor a claim on money obtained by the trustee in settlement
of a suit brought to recover a preference. A bank had a security
interest in lumber owned by the bankrupt, who transferred the lum-
ber to a third party within four months of bankruptcy. The trustee
sued to recover a certain amount and did so in settlement. That
settlement was attached by the bank as the "proceeds" of a prefer-
ence (the transfer of the lumber). The bank claimed that its security
71. Id. at 371.
72. No. 75-55 (M.D. Fla., filed Jan. 16, 1978).
1979]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
interest in the "proceeds" of the inventory reached the amount
recovered in the settlement negotiated by the trustee.
The court rejected the bank's argument for a number of rea-
sons. First, it held that the money received by the trustee was a
settlement of a chose in action available only to the trustee. The
debtor therefore had never "acquired an interest in the collateral"
and its secured creditor (the bank) had never acquired a security
interest. Second, the court held that "proceeds," under section 9-
306, means that which is received simultaneously for collateral to
be sold or disposed of, which is not the case in a preference. Interest-
ingly, and in seeming contrast to its holding, the court observed that
the bank had never acquired a security interest in proceeds anyway.
C. Scope of Security Interest
In In re Ferrell Jewelers, Inc., 3 the court held that accounts
receivable are not covered by a security agreement covering inven-
tory and "substitutions therefor," and that the ten day automatic
perfection provisions of UCC section 9-306(2) 7  were unavailable. A
creditor filed a financing statement covering inventory and
"substitutions therefor." The financing statement was not marked
to indicate that proceeds were covered. A dispute arose between the
trustee and the creditor over whether the creditor's security interest
was limited to the inventory and money derived from liquidation of
the inventory or whether it also extended to monies collected by the
trustee from accounts receivable.75 Rejecting the latter argument,
the court held that the security agreement failed "even to intimate"
that accounts receivable were covered.7
Even if "substitution" were intended to include accounts re-
ceivable, the court concluded that the security interest was never
properly perfected as to accounts receivable because the financing
statement failed to give adequate notice of what it covered.77 Collat-
eral that is not reasonably described fails to advise the world of the
nature of the collateral claimed.7" Thus, a financing statement
73. No. 74-454 (M.D. Fla., filed Oct. 19, 1977).
74. FLA. STAT. § 679.306(2) (1977).
75. The security agreement and financing statement provided: "All furniture, trade
fixtures, showcases, machinery, equipment and inventory, including after acquired property,
and including all additions and accessions thereto and replacement of additions to and
substitutions therefor and any of such items returned or repossessed." In re Ferrell Jewelers,
Inc., slip op. at 2 No. 74-454 (M.D. Fla., filed Oct. 19, 1977).
76. Id. slip op. at 3.
77. Id. The court cited Mitchell v. Sheppard Mall State Bank, 458 F.2d 700 (10th Cir.
1972), a case decided under the Oklahoma version of the Uniform Commercial Code.
78. Id. (citing In re Hodgin, 7 UCC REP. SEarv. 612 (Okla. 1970)).
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which does not give adequate notice does not perfect a security
interest in unidentified collateral.79 The court also said that, be-
cause the financing statement provided a box to be checked when
proceeds were covered, the creditor's failure to place a checkmark
in the box was "seriously misleading." 0
The creditor further argued that the temporary perfection pro-
visions of section 679.306(3) of the Florida Statutes perfected the
accounts receivable."' This argument failed because, when the
debtor is involved in insolvency proceedings, the statute limits the
security interest so perfected to "identifiable cash proceeds" paid
for the collateral when sold. 2 While tangibles exchanged for tangi-
bles and cash derived from sales are covered for ten days by the
statute, the court said that tangibles received from the sale of intan-
gibles are not. Most importantly, the court observed that if it ac-
cepted the creditor's contention, it would mean lenders could not
safely lend against accounts receivable, because any lender on in-
ventory could defeat the interest of a subsequent financer of ac-
counts receivable. The accounts receivable existed before bank-
ruptcy. On the date of bankruptcy the creditor had no perfected
security interest in the accounts receivable, so they vested in the
trustee. As a result, the trustee's judgment lien status, granted him
by section 70c,8 was superior to all unperfected security interests. 4
79. Id. (citing In re Levins, 7 UCC REP. Smav. 1076 (E.D.N.Y. 1970)).
80. Id., slip op at 4.
81. FLA. STAT. § 679.306(3) (1977) provides that a security interest in the proceeds is
continuously perfected if the interest in the original collateral was perfected, but it ceases to
be perfected 10 days after receipt of the proceeds unless a financing statement has been filed
covering the proceeds or a security interest in the proceeds is perfected before the expiration
of 10 days.
82. FLA. STAT. § 679.306(4) (1977) provides that the secured party has a perfected secu-
rity interest in proceeds arising from a debtor who is involved in "insolvency proceedings,"
and identifiable cash proceeds that are not commingled with other money or deposited in a
bank account prior to the insolvency proceeding, and then identifiable cash proceeds in the
form of checks and the like which are not deposited in a bank account prior to the insolvency
proceeding, and in all cash and bank accounts of the debtor, if other cash proceeds have been
commingled. This perfected security interest is subject to any right of set-off and is limited
to an amount not greater than the amount of any cash proceeds received by the debtor within
10 days before the beginning of the insolvency proceedings. Under § 70(c) of the Bankruptcy
Act, 11 U.S.C. § 110(c), the trustee becomes a hypothetical lien creditor at the date of
bankruptcy. As a result, a security interest or lien that does not attach or is not perfected
until after bankruptcy is inferior to the trustee's interest. See, e.g., In re Coed Shoppe, Inc.,
435 F. Supp. 472, 473 (N.D. Fla. 1977). It would therefore obviously be superior to all unper-
fected security interests.
83. See note 70 supra.
84. FLA. STAT. § 679.301 (1977) provides that one who becomes a lien creditor without
knowledge of an unperfected security interest takes priority over an unperfected security
interest. FLA. STAT. § 679.301(3) (1977) defines "lien creditor" to include a trustee in bank-
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In addition, the ten-day grace period allowed under section 9-
306(3)" had long passed without the creditor perfecting his security
interest.
Finally, on the basis of In re Dubman, 11 the plaintiff contended
that proceeds (or accounts receivable) acquired within ten days
after bankruptcy mandate a finding of a perfected security interest.
The court distinguished Dubman, however, because in that case the
court relied on section 9-306(4), which provides for a continuing
perfected security interest in identifiable noncash proceeds in the
event of the debtor's insolvency. The condition precedent to using
section 9-306(4) is that the secured parties have a perfected security
interest in proceeds, which they did not have here.87
VI. REJECTION OF ExEcUTORY CONTRACTS
In In re Garfinkle,u a case of apparent first impression, the
court held that the trustee's rejection of a lease does not terminate
the lease or encumbrances on it but merely places the leasehold
outside bankruptcy administration, and that when the trustee suc-
ceeds to the position of both lessor and lessee, he cannot terminate
the lease to the detriment of a major creditor.
Garfinkle, the bankrupt, simultaneously acquired title to the
fee and leasehold interest of a hotel and then encumbered the lease-
hold. The parties agreed that there would be no merger of title until
a prior mortgage was satisfied. Garfinkle subsequently filed a chap-
ter XII proceeding. The trustee sought to reject the lease, or the
lessee, or terminate it as lessor. The creditor holding the mortgage
on the leasehold objected, and the trustee sued to determine the
validity of the mortgage.
Because the trustee was acting both as lessor and lessee, the
bankruptcy judge was "faced with the unusual situation of a split
personality trustee."8 The trustee was trying, as lessor, to exercise
a lease default provision which allowed termination if the lessee
were adjudicated a bankrupt. The bankruptcy court held that the
ruptcy. It further provides that, unless all the creditors represented by the trustee had knowl-
edge of the security interest, the trustee is a lien creditor without knowledge, even if he
personally had knowledge of the security interest.
85. FLA, STAT. § 679.306(3) (1977).
86. 5 UCC REP. SERv. 910 (W.D. Mich. 1968).
87. In re Ferrell Jewelers, Inc., No. 74-454, slip op. at 5 (M.D. Fla., filed Oct. 19, 1977).
See also, In re Gibson Prods., 543 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 946 (1977);
Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Flowers Mobile Home Sales, Inc., 217 S.E.2d 108 (N.C. App. 1975).
88. 577 F.2d 901 (5th Cir. 1978).
89. Id. at 903.
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trustee, as lessee, could reject the lease, but that did not destroy the
leasehold estate or the mdrtgage on it. The court held that the
trustee, as lessor, could not exercise the lease default clause because
that would effect an inequitable merger.9
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and re-
manded. It held that the trustee's "rejection" as lessee merely
placed the leasehold outside of the trustee's administration without
destroying the lease estate and its mortgages." It remanded the
attempted termination of the lease question for a determination of
whether the leasehold's mortgagee could pick up the lease and pay
for it."
In In re Jackson Brewing Co., 13 the trustee was allowed to reject
a burdensome purchase option even though that would not make
assets available to other creditors. In this chapter X proceeding, the
trustee sought to reject an option given a third party to purchase
real estate worth $5 million for $2.7 million. The trustee claimed the
option was burdensome. The option-holder argued that the bank-
ruptcy judge could not allow rejection because the option did not
burden the estate: only the bankrupt was benefited by the rejection
and no assets were made available. to other creditors. Characterizing
the option-holder's argument as "transparent," the court held that
an option to purchase a major asset of the estate for half its value
was "an onerously burdensome contract" properly rejected by the
trustee."
VII. OTHER CREDITORS AND CLAIMANTS
A. Right to Notice of Foreclosure
Rule 203 requires the court to give at least ten days' notice of
any proposed sale of property. 5 In In re First Baptist Church, Inc., "
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that rule 203 does
not apply to chapter X proceedings, and that no federal law or rule
requires notice to creditors of a foreclosure sale conducted by a state
court with leave of the bankruptcy court. The court noted that the
chapter X judge has discretionary authority to give notice in state
90. Id.
91. Id. at 903-04. The court relied on Brown v. O'Keefe, 300 U.S. 598 (1937), in which
the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Cardozo, held that a bankrupt retains title to
assets which have been rejected as burdensome by the trustee.
92. Id. at 906.
93. 567 F.2d 618 (5th Cir. 1978).
94. Id. at 621.
95. FED. R. BANKRUPTCY P. 203.
96. 564 F.2d 677 (5th Cir. 1977).
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court mortgage foreclosures, and authority to permit a state mort-
gage foreclosure to proceed. Once the foreclosure was committed to
the state court, the court said, no federal notice provisions apply."
The court distinguished the requirement of reorganization rule 10-
209(b)(4)98 that the trustee give all creditors at least twenty days'
notice of any proposed sale of property, on the ground that the rule
was intended to give notice only of sales conducted by the trustee
or by the debtor in posession under an order entered under rule 10-
607(b).11
B. Bondholders
In In re Aldersgate Foundation, Inc., 11o the debtor, a nonprofit
corporation in a chapter X reorganization, leased land from the
plaintiffs. The plaintiffs subordinated their leasehold interest to
that of the bondholders and the bonds were secured by the leased
property. The Securities and Exchange Commission had claimed
that issuance of the bond secured by the leased property violated
the federal securities laws.
The management committee that took over the operation of the
bankrupt consolidated the former bonds into a "phase III" series,
which did not prejudice the existing bondholders, but in fact gave
them additional security. The plaintiff, however, claimed the bonds
were void under section 29(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
because the original bonds were fraudulently sold and therefore
their consolidation into phase III bonds was invalid. The court re-
jected that argument, finding that: (1) the solicitation of the bond-
holders' consent did not involve the purchase or sale of a security
because it did not involve a "new investment decision;" (2) the
plaintiffs' delay of three years in seeking rescission precluded them
from seeking relief under that provision of the securities law; and
(3) section 29(c) "preserves the validity of liens acquired by persons
without actual knowledge of facts by which the acquisition of such
lien violated the Federal Securities Laws."' 0' In short, the court held
that the plaintiffs could not pervert the purpose of section 29(b) by
voiding the rights of those whom the section was designed to protect.
97. The court quoted 6 COLLIER, supra note 5, 3.08 (1977) for the proposition that once
the bankruptcy court permits submission of a matter to another proper court, "that court
has jurisdiction of all the incidents of the litigation within its scope, and the judgment thereon
is binding on the trustee, receiver or debtor in possession as the case may be." Id. at 680.
98. FED. R. BANKRUPTCY P. 10-209(b)(4).
99. In re First Baptist Church, Inc., 564 F.2d at 680.
100. No. 74-383 (M.D. Fla., filed May 16, 1978).




In In re Transystems, '0" the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit held that "intent" was the critical criterion in determining
whether money advanced by a parent to a subsidiary is a loan or a
contribution to capital. It also held that finding such intent is a
question of fact for the bankruptcy judge, and as a question of fact
such finding will withstand challenge unless it is clearly erroneous.
In Transystems, the parent corporation advanced its subsidiary
$385,000, knowing that the subsidiary was in serious financial trou-
ble. The advances were evidenced by a demand (rather than time)
note, secured by a chattel mortgage on all of the subsidiary's proper-
ties which were not otherwise encumbered. After the subsidiary
went bankrupt, the parent, which had guaranteed certain loans to
a creditor, assigned to the creditor the collateral the parent had
taken for the "loan" to the subsidiary.'0 3
The bankruptcy court denied the creditor's claim under the
assignment, reducing the claimant's status to that of an unsecured
creditor. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court, holding
.that the status of the money advance was a question of fact which
should be reviewed under the "clearly erroneous" standard. 0
The district court had earlier held that the loan-or-contribution
question was one which should be decided under state law. The
Fifth Circuit interpreted the one Florida case dealing with the ques-
tion, Pierce v. Scott, °5 as requiring an analysis of the parent's intent
when it made the advance, held that finding intent was a question
of fact and followed rule 810 of the Bankruptcy Rules of Procedurel",
in deciding that the district court had correctly applied the "clearly
erroneous" standard.' 0
Pierce laid down three criteria for determining whether an ad-.
vance was a loan or a contribution to capital. It was a loan only
when it (1) was made for the benefit of the corporation; (2) was free
of any fraud or bad faith; and (3) gave the parent no advantage over
the other stockholders and creditors of the corporation.' 8 While the
102. 569 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1978).
103. Id. at 1365.
104. Id. at 1366.
105. 142 Fla. 581, 195 So. 160 (1940).
106. FED. R. BANKRUPTCY P. 810 specifies that, upon appeal, the district court "shall
accept the referee's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. ... Thus to apply
the "clearly erroneous" standard, the question at bar first had to be found to be one of fact.
107. In re Transystems, 569 F.2d at 1366-69. Contra, In re Mobile Steel Co., 563 F.2d
692, 702-03 (5th Cir. 1977) (intent of parties "irrelevant;" state law not applied).
108. Pierce v. Scott, 142 Fla. at 584, 195 So. at 161.
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Transystems court found that the parent was unable to meet the
third point of the Pierce test, it nevertheless inferred an overriding
concern with intent from the Pierce critera. The court said: "Intent
is the substance which weaves the three [Pierce standards] into a
coherent form."'' 9
The court found several factors to support its opinion that the
district court correctly concluded that the bankruptcy court did not
commit clear error in finding the advance a contribution to capital.
They were: (1) the note had no maturity date; (2) it was issued at a
time when the subsidiary had a negative net worth and could not
get a similar bank loan; (3) the parent had expressly indicated that
the subsidiary needed an infusion of capital; and, (4) the parent had
come to dominate the management and operation of the subsidiary,
with the president of the parent also becoming the president of the
subsidiary.'
All of these factors, the court said, supported the inference that
the advance was not a loan with a reasonable expectation of repay-
ment, but rather capital risked upon the success of the venture. To
find otherwise, the court said, would permit the parent "the unwar-
ranted luxury of treating its advance as a loan when the recipient
suffers a terminal financial decline and as a contribution to capital
when the recipient proceeds to a financial recovery.''
The court viewed its holding as placing parent corporations on
notice "that they will not be permitted to utilize ambiguity [in
making payments to subsidiaries] in order to hedge their bets.""' 2
D. Limited Partners
In In re IFC International,"' the court held that a dissolution
of partnership under section 620.16 of the Florida Statutes is neces-
sary before a general partner may purchase the limited partners'
interests. The debtor, a corporation, was the general partner in a
limited partnership organized under chapter 620 of the Florida Stat-
utes. The claimants were limited partners. The debtor wrote the
claimants offering to buy their limited partnership interests and
they accepted.
The debtor, however, objected to the claims asking payment for
the partnership interests, arguing that there was no contract be-
109. In re Transystems, 569 F.2d at 1367.
110. Id. at 1369-70.
111. Id. at 1371.
112. Id.
113. No. 76-306 (M.D. Fla., filed Mar. 7,1978).
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cause any agreement would be illegal and therefore unenforceable
under section 620.16 of the Florida Statutes."' Section 620.16, pro-
vides in part:"5
(1) A limited partner shall not receive from a general partner or
out of partnership property any part of his contribution until:
(a) All liabilities of the partnership, except liabilities to
general partners and to limited partners on account of
their contributions, have been paid or there remains
property of the partnership sufficient to pay them.
(b) The consent of all members is had, unless the return
of the contribution may be rightfully demanded under
the provision of subsection (2), and
(c) The certificate is cancelled or so amended as to set
forth the withdrawal or reduction.
The court found that the purpose of the statute was to prevent a
limited partner from receiving any part of his contribution until the
debts of the partnership were paid, unless all other limited partners
consented. It applied the same rationale to the prohibition against
the general partner paying a limited partner for his contributions.
The court found the situation analogous to one where creditors
of a corporation may recover dividends improperly paid while the
company was insolvent."' It also noted that the contract to buy the
partnership interests would be voidable, since the debtor-in-
possession possessed all the powers of a trustee in bankruptcy."'
E. Political Entities as Trust Beneficiaries
1. THE STATE
In In re Adult Mental Health Clinic, "I the state's claim that
payments to the bankrupt were held in trust for it was denied. The
bankrupt, a mental health clinic, contracted with the state to sup-
ply alcholism and mental health facilities. Under the contract the
bankrupt agreed to return all funds spent in violation of its agree-
114. Id. slip op. at 1.
115. FLA. STAT. § 620.16 (1977).
116. In re IFC Int'l, No. 76-306, at 3 (M.D. Fla. filed Mar. 7, 1978). In drawing the
analogy, the court relied on cases decided under former FLA. STAT. §§ 608.52, .53 (1973)
(repealed by 1975 Fla. Laws, ch. 75-250), but said a similar result would probably be reached
under FLA. STAT. § 607.14 (1977), which permits corporations to guarantee obligations of
employees. Id. The court apparently had intended to cite FLA. STAT. § 607.144 (1977) which,
inter alia, provides that a corporation director shall be personally liable for dividends paid
contrary to law.
117. In re IFC Int'l, No. 76-306, at 4 (M.D. Fla., filed Mar. 7, 1978).
118. No. 76-594 (M.D. Fla., filed Jan. 17, 1977).
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ment with the state or in violation of law. The bankrupt was paid
almost $200,000 for services rendered under the contract, and when
the facility went bankrupt, the state filed a claim to recover those
monies, arguing that they were held in trust for the state.
The court rejected the state's argument for a variety of reasons.
First, the agreement did not clearly create an express trust.. There
was no fraud involved to give rise to a constructive trust. A resulting
trust could not only be found if the funds advanced for operation of
the facilities were advanced so the facility could purchase some-
thing to be held for the benefit of the state, which was clearly not
the case. Emphasizing that "the theme of the Bankruptcy Act is
equality of distribution,""' the court said that it would be unfair to
deprive creditors of the very money furnished the facility by the
state for payment of creditors.
2. MUNICIPALITIES
In a later decision in the same case, 120 the court imposed a
resulting trust in favor of the City of St. Petersburg on certain
equipment, while disallowing claims of express or constructive trust
against other equipment. The court appeared to be persuaded by
the parties' agreement regarding the ultimate disposition of the two
groups of personalty. In the first, the equipment could not be sold,
transferred or otherwise disposed of without the city's written ap-
proval. There, the court allowed a resulting trust.
In the second group, the clinic had the right to sell, trade or
otherwise dispose of the equipment in question. The court refused
to impose an express trust because the parties' arrangement demon-
strated there was no intention of creating such a trust, and found
that the bad faith or fraud necessary to impose a constructive trust
was not present.'
F. Bulk Sales
In In re Spanish River 76, Inc.,'22 the court indicated that an
automobile service station sale might be subject to the Bulk Sales
Act. "'23 A major portion of the business of the station was as a whole-
119. Id. slip op. at 4 (quoting 3 COLLER, supra note 5, 60.01 (1977)).
120. In re Adult Mental Health Clinic, No. 77-594 (M.D. Fla., filed June 22, 1978).
121. Id. slip op at 3.
122. No. 77-1360 (S.D. Fla., filed Aug. 25, 1978).
123. FLA. STAT. §§ 676.101 to .110 (1977). The Act, which generally follows art. VI of the
Uniform Commercial Code, requires notice to all creditors when an entire business is sold, or
where there is a transfer of "a major part of the material, supplies, merchandise or other
inventory of an enterprise .... " FLA. STAT. § 676.102(1) (1977).
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sale auto parts distributor. The court held that the principal busi-
ness of the bankrupt was the sale of merchandise from stock,2 4 and
allowed the trustee to recover the money value of the inventory of
the business from the two individuals who had purchased the busi-
ness without complying with the provisions of the Bulk Sales Act. 2 5
The court suggested that even without such an auto parts com-
ponent, the business of the service station was not necessarily out-
side the bulk sales law. It pointed out that although a restaurant
sale had been held not to be within the Bulk Sales Act, 2 the legisla-
ture had promptly amended the Act to overrule that decision.2 7
G. Right to Interest
£ In In re Kurant, 28 the court held that interest is to be awarded
from the date a debt becomes fixed, rather than from the date of
judgment, notwithstanding the requirement of title 28, section 1961
of the United States Code that interest runs from the entry of judg-
ment. The plaintiff, a stockbroker, sued the bankrupt for a defi-
ciency in his margin account, which became fixed on October 22,
1974. The question before the court was whether interest was allow-
able on the debt from the day it became a fixed obligation or from
the date of judgment.
Florida law is clear that interest is to be computed from the
date of liquidation, not the date of judgment. 9 In holding that
interest ran from the date the debt became fixed, rather than from
the date of judgment, the court noted that Kurant had agreed to pay
monthly interest, and relied on Louisiana & Arkansas Railway v.
Export Drum Co., ' in which the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
124. In re Spanish River 76, Inc., No. 77-1360, at 5 (S.D. Fla., filed Aug. 25, 1978).
The bulk sales law applies to enterprises "whose principal business is the sale of the
merchandise from stock." FLA. STAT. § 676.102(3) (1977). When the principal business of an
enterprise is the rendition of services, the Act does not apply. See, e.g., In re Weis Securities,
Inc., 24 UCC REP. SERV. 402 (2d Cir. 1978) (stockbroker); Varco v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co.,
414 F. Supp. 1219 (E.D. La. 1976), affl'd, 545 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1977) (data processing);
Automatic Truck & Trailer Wash Centers, Inc. v. Eastamp, Inc., 320 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 2d DCA
1975) (truck washing); Fifth Third Bank v. Kentucky Club, Inc., 24 UCC REP. SERv. 398
(Ky. App. 1978) (bar and restaurant). Cf. National Bank of Royal Oak v. Frydlewici, 67
Mich. App. 417, 241 N.W.2d 471 (1976) (furniture store).
125. In re Spanish River 76, Inc., No. 77-1360, at 5 (S.D. Fla., filed Aug. 25, 1978).
126. De La Rosa v. Tropical Sandwiches, Inc., 298 So. 2d 471 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974), cert.
denied, 312 So. 2d 760 (Fla. 1975).
127. 1975 Fla. Laws, ch. 75-216 (amending FLA. STAT. § 676.102(3) to include inter-
prises doing business as restaurants when licensed by the Division of Hotels and Restau-
rants).
128. No. 77-4 (M.D. Fla., filed Mar. 30, 1978).
129. Id. slip op at 1. See also Tech Corp. v. Permuttit Co., 321 So. 2d 562 (1975); Klein
v. Newberger, Loeb & Co., 151 So. 2d 879 (1963).
130. 359 F.2d 311 (5th Cir. 1966).
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Circuit held that section 1961 relates only to interest recoverable on
the judgment itself, not to compensatory prejudgment interest.
H. Equitable Subordination
In a non-Florida case nevertheless worthy of note, the Fifth
Circuit laid out an analysis for applying equitable subordination . 3
In In re Mobile Steel Co., 32 the court refused to apply the doctrine
on the facts presented, and also said that equity may only subordi-
nate the claims of otherwise preferred creditors in bankruptcy, not
disallow themThe bankruptcy judge decided to subordinate some
of the secured claims of the bankrupt's insiders, 3 3 and to disallow
others. The district court affirmed, and the Fifth Circuit reversed.
In so doing, the panel first limited the role of equity to subordi-
nating claims, saying, "equitable considerations can justify only the
subordination of claims, not their disallowance.' '3 4 It then recited
three conditions which must be satisfied before equitable subordi-
nation is appropriate: (1) the preferred claimant must have engaged
in some type of inequitable conduct; (2) the misconduct must have
either injured other creditors or given the claimant an unfair advan-
tage; and (3) equitable subordination of the particular claim must
not be inconsistent with bankruptcy statutes.
35
The court also listed three principles which must be considered
in determining whether the prerequisites have been met: (1) ine-
quitable conduct does not have to be related to the claim asserted;
(2) claims may be subordinated only in the amount necessary to
offset the harm caused the bankrupt or its creditors; and (3) the
objection of a person seeking to force subordination "must contain
some substantial factual basis to support [the] allegation of impro-
priety".before a fiduciary must come forward with proof to overcome
the allegations. 3 ' The court emphasized that the last principle is
necessary to avoid placing an "unwarranted burden" on fiduciaries
131. The doctrine of equitable subordination is applied to lower the priority of certain
claimants to a bankrupt's assets below that of other creditors, giving the previously preferred
claimants a smaller slice of the liquidated estate. A sufficient consideration for applying the
doctrine "may simply be the violation of rules of fair play and good conscience by the
claimant [or] a breach of the fiduciary standards of conduct which he owes the corporation,
its stockholders and creditors." Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 310-11 (1939).
132. 563 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1977). The case came from the Southern District of Alabama.
133. The appellants were organizers, officers and directors of the bankrupt, members of
their immediate families and a corporation which one of them controlled. Id. at 695.
134. Id. at 699.
135. Id. at 699-700.
136. Id. at 700-02. The court interpreted Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939), as requir-
ing the allegation of some substantial factual basis. Id. at 701.
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which would require them "to prove the good faith and fairness of
every one of their actions with respect to their corporation at the
pleasure of the Trustee.""'3 As to the issue of whether certain deben-
tures were really contributions to capital rather than loans, the
court did not apply state law, and also stated that the intentions of
the parties involved were irrelevant.' 38 The opposite analysis was
used in another Fifth Circuit case noted earlier in this article.'
3
I. Banks
In In re Maule Industries, Inc., '10 the trusteiof one bankrupt
(Miami Concrete) brought an action against another bankrupt
(Maule Industries) to set aside certain transfers from Miami Con-
crete to Maule made one month. before Miami Concrete's bank-
ruptcy. Maule owned and controlled Miami Concrete during all
times relevent, and kept an unlimited open line of credit to Miami
Concrete. Maule kept Miami Concrete operating far after it should
have closed. When a writ of execution was issued against Miami
Concrete, Miami Concrete transferred to Maule eleven pieces of
equipment worth almost $100,000, as well as over $100,000 of receiv-
ables. These transfers occurred within a month before bankruptcy.
The plaintiff argued three theories. The first was that there was
an actual intent to defraud Miami Concrete's creditors under sec-
tion 726.01 of the Florida Statutes, thereby rendering the transfers
void."' The court held, however, that the plaintiff had demon-
strated merely "an intent to obtain a legally defensible security
position" and not the required fraudulent intent.'42 It was also recog-
nized that Maule so dominated Miami Concrete that there was in
fact but one party and therefore no "transfer" within the meaning
of the statute."3
Second, the plaintiff successfully argued the applicability of
section 608.55 of the Florida Statutes,"' which renders void any
transfer to a stockholder by an insolvent corporation, when made
137. Id. at 701 (emphasis in original).
138. Id. at 702-03.
139. In re Transystems, 569 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1978). See notes 102-112 and accompany-
ing text supra.
140. No. 76-1128 (S.D. Fla., filed Apr. 21, 1978).
141. Section 726.01 is the general fraudulent conveyance statute in Florida. It declares
every sale or transfer of lands or chattels "devised of fraud" or for the "purpose or intent to
delay, hinder or defraud creditors .. .to be utterly void." FLA. STAT. § 726.01 (1977).
142. In re Maule Indus., Inc., No. 76-1128; at 3 (S.D. Fla., filed Apr. 21, 1978).
143. Id.
144. Section 608.55 was repealed on January 1, 1976, but continues to govern actions
based on events arising before that date. See FLA. STAT. § 607.414 (1977).
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with the intent to give a preference. It was held that Maule, through
its complete domination of Miami Concrete, effected these transfers
with the expectation of being preferred.'
Lastly, and most persuasively, the plaintiff argued that
Maule's claim ought to be subordinated to the claims of the other
creditors on equitable grounds. While it is not unlawful for a
stockholder-creditor to obtain a security agreement from an insol-
vent debtor corporation, the circumstances surrounding such a
transfer are subject to scrutiny.' 6 Examining the relationship of the
parties and characterizing Maule essentially as an "investor" rather
than as a creditor, the court invoked the doctrine of "equitable
subordination""'  to hold that the money Maule put into Miami
Concrete was really a capital contribution and not a secured debt.
To support this conclusion, the court emphasized that Maule kept
Miami Concrete "alive" at a continuing loss, and that it converted
its investment into a secured debt only when it became apparent
that the venture could not succeed. ' 8 The court relied on the princi-
ples stated in International Telephone & Telegraph Corp. v.
Holton, I to hold these circumstances warranted equitable inter-
vention to the point of subordinating Maule's claim to those of all
other creditos. 50
145. In re Maule Indus., Inc., No. 76-1128, at 3 (S.D. Fla., filed Apr. 21, 1978).
146. Id. (citing Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939)); 3A COLLIER, supra note 5,
163.06 [5.31.
147. The origin of the "equitable subordination" concept in bankruptcy is Pepper v.
Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939), in which the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the "courts of
bankruptcy are essentially courts of equity," and that the bankruptcy court is to apply "the
principles and rules of equity jurisprudence." Id. at 304. Among the abilities that the Su-
preme Court recognized as being inherent in the bankruptcy courts' equitable powers are
those which may effect "subordination in light of equitable considerations." Id. at 305. As
the Court stated:
In the exercise of its equitable jurisdiction the bankruptcy court has the power to
sift the circumstances surrounding any claim to see that injustice or unfairness
is not done in administration of the bankrupt estate. And its duty so to do is
especially clear when the claim seeking allowance accrues to the benefit of an
officer, director, or stockholder. That is clearly the power and duty of the bank-
ruptcy courts under the reorganization sections.
Id. at 307-08. For a good general discussion of equitable subordination, see In re Stirling
Homex Corp., 579 F.2d 206 (2d Cir. 1978). See also In re Multiponics, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 1065
(E.D. La. 1977).
148. In re Maule Indus., Inc., No. 76-1128, at 5 (S.D. Fla., filed Apr. 21, 1978).
149. 247 F.2d 178 (4th Cir. 1957).





In In re Miami Book Manufacturing, Inc., 1 the trustee of the
bankrupt, a book printer, sued to recover an amount owing on a
book printing contract. The defendant sought to assert a set-off,
based on the destruction of certain of defendant's printed materials
in a fire at the bankrupt's place of business. The trustee claimed
that no set-off was possible under section 68a 52 of the Act, because
the claim was not a "mutual debt or mutual credit between the
estate of a bankrupt and a creditor."' 53 The court- agreed with the
trustee and disallowed the claimed set-off. 5' In so holding, the court
relied on the general rule that, "to be mutual, the debts or credit
must be in the same right and between the same parties standing
in the same capacity."'' 5
2. BANKS
In In re Miami Concrete Corp.,' a case of first impression in
Florida, the court held in accordance with the weight of authority
that a fully secured bank creditor could not set off the contents of
its creditor-depositor's bank account against the amount the deposi-
tor owed the bank on a secured debt, when the bank was served with
a writ of garnishment on that account, so long as the debt to the
bank was fully secured and had not yet matured. The court empha-
sized the fact that the indebtedness of the depositor was not due at
the time of the garnishment and distinguished on this point the only
Florida case to consider the question, Barsco, Inc. v. H. W W,
Inc., "'57 which allowed a set-off because there was a default at the
time of the garnishment. The Barsco decision, however, has been
expressly limited to its facts.'
8
151. No. 76-1128 (S.D. Fla., filed June 23, 1978).
152. Section 68a provides: "In all cases of mutual debts or mutual credits between the
estate of a bankrupt and the creditor the account shall be stated and one debt shall be set
off against the other, and the balance only shall be allowed or paid." Bankruptcy Act § 688a,
11 U.S.C. § 108(a).
153. Id.
154. It is well settled that the right to a set-off under § 68a is discretionary, and that
the bankruptcy court should be guided by the general rules of equity in the exercise of this
discretion. See In re Diplomat Elec., Inc., 499 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1974); Bennick v. Avco
Financial Serva., 435 F. Supp. 359 (D. Neb. 1977).
155. See Shank v. Board of Educ., 42 A.D.2d 876, 347 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1973).
156. No. 77-975-BK (S.D. Fla., filed Apr. 12, 1978).
157. 346 So. 2d 134 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
158. Id. at 136.
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K. Divorced Spouses: Tenants in Common
Florida law provides that on dissolution of marriage the spouses
become tenants in common of any property previously owned by the
entireties.'59 Tenants in common have an obligation to pay taxes,
make mortgage payments and in general to preseve the property.
Each has a right to be reimbursed by the other tenant when the
payments exceed their one-half share. 6 "
In In re Elinor Newton's Green Turtle, Inc., "I' a divorced wife
who made mortgage and tax payments that her bankrupt ex-
husband was supposed to make under the dissolution decree was
allowed to recover only half the amount of his obligation on sale of
the property. The wife sued her ex-husband and the trustee to ob-
tain a modification of the automatic stay so as to permit her to
establish her claim to the home they jointly owned.
On the sale of the home, the question for the bankruptcy court
was whether the wife was entitled to be reimbursed for the amounts
she had paid to satisfy the obligations of the ex-husband. Relying
on Hendricks v. Hendricks,'2 the court held that the wife was only
entitled to one-half the amount she had paid (even though the ex-
husband had been obligated to pay this amount) and to one-half of
the remaining net proceeds realized from the house. It reasoned that
the dissolution decree created no special equity in favor of the wife,
and that, as a tenant in common, this was all she was entitled to
receive.'63
VIII. PROCEDURE
A. Late Filed Claims
In In re Troyan, "I the trustee moved to strike an IRS claim filed
over six months after the deadline for such a filing. The IRS argued
that its answer, filed in an adversary proceeding instituted by the
trustee against the IRS and an insurance company, constituted a
claim timely filed or, in the alternative, that the IRS did not have
to file a claim." 5
The court held that the government's answer in the prior pro-
ceeding did not constitute a claim, and noted that the judgment
159. FLA. STAT. § 689.15 (1977).
160. See Whitely v. Whitely, 329 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976).
161. No. 76-602 (S.D. Fla., filed Mar. 14, 1978).
162. 312 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975).
163. No. 76-602, slip op. at 2.
164. No. 76-726 (S.D. Fla., filed Aug. 23, 1978).
165. Id. slip op. at 2.
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therein expressly stated that the defendants were not precluded
from filing their claims against the bankrupt estate. The IRS had
had ample time to file a claim and was not misled into believing
that its claim had already been presented. 6' Further, it was held
that section 57n 67 of the Act clearly requires that a claim of the
United States be filed like any other claim. Thus, the tax claim was
stricken although the tax lien was not thereby extinguished. 68
B. Objections to Claims
In In re Henderson,"'6 a chapter XIII (wage earner) proceeding,
the trustee was permitted to object to the claims of certain creditors
between twelve and seventeen months after these claims had been
automatically allowed, and thus included in the various plans. The
claims at issue were based on loans that were indisputably void
under the Georgia Industrial Loan Act. 70 The issue presented was
whether the trustee's delay prevented him from contesting these
claims under either the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure or principles
of equity.
The court, relying on rules 13-307111 and 13-308,172 held that
because the claims had been automatically allowed, as opposed to
allowed by order, the ten-day limit of rule 13-308 for seeking a
reconsideration of a claim was not applicable, and therefore the
trustee was not barred from contesting these claims.7 3 It was recog-
nized that to hold otherwise would render nugatory the regulatory
scheme of the rules by effectively precluding a careful examination
of claims.' The court also dismissed the argument that the doc-
trines of equitable estoppel and laches barred the trustee. It pointed
166. Id.
167. Bankruptcy Act § 57n, 11 U.S.C. § 93n.
168. See 3 COLLIER, supra note 5, 157.03 [3.3] n.60.
169. 577 F.2d 997 (5th Cir. 1978).
170. Id. at 999.
171. Rule 13-307(b) provides that a properly filed claim "shall be deemed allowed"
unless an objection is made. Rule 13-307(c) authorizes an objection to the allowance of a
claim. The rule requires that the objection be in writing and that ten day's notice of the
hearing on the claim be given the debtor. FED. R. BANKRUPTCY P. 13-307(b), (c).
172. Bankruptcy rule 13-308 imposes a 10 day limit for seeking a reconsideration of "an
order allowing or disallowing a claim against the estate .... "
173. In re Henderson, 577 F.2d 997, 1001 (5th Cir. 1978).
174. Id. The court also noted that Bankruptcy Act § 571 allows the recovery of dividends
paid to a creditor on invalid claims. If the trustee were required to object to a claim within
10 days of its automatic allowance, there would be no need for the recovery provision. Id. at
1001 n.4.
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out that equitable estoppel was. not available unless intentional
deception was shown,'76 and that laches was not available because
there had been no showing of unreasonable delay and prejudice.'7
C. Revocation of Confirmation
Section 386 of the Act provides methods by which "parties in
interest" can challenge the confirmation of any plan of arrange-
ments and have it revoked if they can prove that fraud was prac-
ticed in procuring the arrangement and that the person petitioning
first learned of the fraud after confirmation.'77 The petition must be
filed within six months after confirmation, and the party seeking to
have the confirmation set aside must bear the burden of proof in
showing that it acquired knowledge of the fraud after confirma-
tion. 7
In In re Ernest Berthe,"I a creditor sought revocation of the
court's confirmation of the debtor's chapter XI plan of arrangement
on the ground that the debtor had misrepresented that an obligation
to the creditor was fully secured. The debtor, a sole shareholder of
a corporate debtor which had also filed a chapter XI petition, set
forth in his schedules and testified in a deposition that he was a
guarantor of an obligation owed by the corporate debtor to the peti-
tioning creditor, and further that this obligation was fully secured.8 0
In reliance upon the debtor's sworn testimony and schedules, the
creditor did not file a claim in the chapter XI proceedings of the
debtor. The obligation, however, was not fully secured and the cred-
itor filed a complaint pursuant to section 386 of the Act to revoke
the confirmation on the grounds that the debtor knew or should
have known the obligation was not fully secured, and that the credi-
tor relied on the statements of the debtor in failing to file a claim
as an unsecured creditor.'
In denying the creditor's petition, the court emphasized that
section 386 requires that the fraud be practiced in procuring the
arrangement, and not simply in connection with the decision of a
creditor not to file a claim.'82 The court found that the fraud alleged
175. Id. at 1001.
176. Id.
177. Bankruptcy Act § 386, 11 U.S.C. § 786.
178. See In re 20546 Corp., 408 F. Supp. 959 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Bankruptcy Act § 386, 11
U.S.C. § 786.
179. No. 76-922 (M.D. Fla., filed May 5, 1978).
180. Id. slip op. at 1.
181. Id. slip op. at 2.
182. Id. slip op. at 3.
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was not instrumental in procuring confirmation, although if the
bank had filed the claim it could have vetoed the plan and pre-
vented confirmation. The court, however, decided that there was no
justifiable reliance by the bank in relying on the word of the debtor,
because the bank was always able to file a contingent unliquidated
claim, regardless of the existence of collateral for the debt. Fraud
requires justifiable reliance in such a situation.'9
D. Attorney-Client Privilege
In In re Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc.,'"4 the attorney-
client privilege was not recognized where its revocation would have
benefited the creditor more than the court felt it should. There, a
bank creditor consulted its lawyer about the possible legal conse-
quences of a proposed seizure of the bankrupt's bank account. The
seizure turned out to be a preference, for which the trustee sued.
The trustee sent written interrogatories to the defendant involving
certain communications between the defendant and its attorney
concerning the seizure. The bank raised the attorney-client privilege
in response to the interrogatories.'"
The court rejected the exercise of the privilege, concluding that
under the circumstances, the privilege would prevent the discovery
of an act of "questionable legality" (the preference). 88 In so ruling,
the court pointed out that present-day litigants challenging the
attorney-client privilege are "treated more liberally,' ' s7 even though
they still must prove that the communication exceeds the estab-
lished bonds of privilege. Those bonds include elimination of the
privilege where the discussions involve prospective fraud or where
a failure to deny the privilege would permit substantial abuse of the
attorney-client relationship.'"
A preference is not illegal, nor is it a crime.' Thus, the bank
argued that the taking of a preference was not an act of
"questionable legality," but simply one that upsets the equal distri-
bution of assets among creditors. The court, however, viewed the
183. Id. See Columbus Hotel Corp. v. Hotel Management Co., 116 Fla. 464, 156 So. 893
(1934).
184. No. 76-557 (M.D. Fla., filed Oct. 14, 1977).
185. Id. slip op. at 1.
186. Id. slip op. at 4; see Pouncy v. State, 353 So. 2d 640. (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); Sepler v.
State, 191 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966); FLA. Evw. CODE § 90.502 (effective July 1, 1979).
187. No. 76-557, slip op. at 3.
188. Id.; see Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
874 (1971); I.T. & T. Corp. v. United Tel. Co., 60 F.R.D. 177 (M.D. Fla. 1973).
189. See Bankruptcy Act § 60, 11 U.S.C. § 96; 3 CoLLIm, supra note 5, 60.03 (distin-
guishing between preferences and fraudulent conveyances).
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transaction at issue as more in the nature of a fraudulent transfer,
and pointed out that "[s]ustaining an assertion of the privilege in
the instant case would allow an allegedly preferred creditor to bene-
fit economically from the transaction in contravention of the general
scheme of distribution."'90 The privilege would then become "less of
an encouragement for clients to freely seek advice of counsel and
more of a cloak for conduct which is of questionable legality, even
though not inherently immoral."''
E. Appeal
In In re Ben Hyman & Co.,"'9 the court examined section 24a
of the Act, distinguishing between "proceedings in bankruptcy,"
which are appealable even if interlocutory, and "controversies aris-
ing in proceedings in bankruptcy," which must be final orders to be
appealed. Section 24a provides for appeals, "from the several courts
of bankruptcy . . . in proceedings in bankruptcy, either interlocu-
tory or final, and in controversies arising in proceedings in bank-
ruptcy . . . . .'" Professor Moore has characterized section 24a as
an "astonishing departure from the final judgment rule."' 94
In Hyman, a chapter XI debtor was in a dispute with a bank
as to whether the filing of his petition in bankruptcy cut off the right
of the bank to a set-off. The bankruptcy court held that it did,' 5 and
the bank appealed to the district court. Before the appeal was
heard, the chapter XI petition was converted into bankruptcy.
Therefore, the district court remanded the case to the bankruptcy
court to determine whether the bank had a right to a set-off in the
bankruptcy. The bankrupt appealed the remand. The circuit court,
relying on the distinction between "proceedings" in bankruptcy and
"controversies," as delineated in In re Durensky, I held the dispute
190. No. 76-557, slip op. at 5.
191. Id. The court observed that there is no requirment of a finding of moral turpitude
before making an exception to the attorney-client privilege.
192. 577 F.2d 966 (5th Cir. 1978).
193. Bankruptcy Act § 24a, 11 U.S.C. § 47(a) (emphasis added).
194. 577 F.2d at 967; 9 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACICE, 110.19 [5] (2d ed. 1975).
195. 577 F.2d at 966, 967.
196. 519 F.2d 1024 (5th Cir. 1975). The court therein stated the distinction as follows:
As a general rule, "proceedings" are those matters of an administrative character,
including questions between the bankrupt and his creditors which are presented
in the ordinary course of the administration of the bankrupt's estate.
"Controversies," on the other hand, are usually described as matters which arise
in the course of the bankruptcy proceedings and which are not mere steps in the
ordinary administration of the bankrupt, but which present distinct and separa-
ble issues between the trustee and adverse claimants concerning the right and
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to be a "controversy" which was not final and therefore not appeala-
ble.107
In In re Baird,' the bankrupt's counsel filed both a notice of
appeal and a motion to extend the time for the filing of the appeal
approximately three weeks after the time for filing had expired.
Although the notice and motion were filed within thirty days of
judgment, the time to appeal had expired because there were no
motions addressed to the judgment."' Counsel argued excusable
neglect, 00 stating that he was misled and confused by the wording
of rule 4(a), which states that in a civil case the notice of appeal
shall be filed within thirty days from the date of entry of the judg-
ment.201 The court, however, noted that counsel ignored the words
of rule 4(a) which state that that rule applies only to appeals
"permitted by law as of right from a district court to a court of
appeals . . "202 Finding that it was "inconceivable" that any
attorney could believe that rule 4(a) applied to any appeal from the
bankruptcy court, the court found no excusable neglect.203 It pointed
out that excusable neglect lies in grounds such as the disability of
the person to whom the notice has been entrusted for filing, uncon-
trollable delay by mail transmission, death or other extraordinary
circumstances, which the court did not feel were present.2 4
IX. POWERS OF THE TRUSTEE
A. Preferences and Voidable Assignments
1. BROKERAGE COMMISSIONS
In In re Fortiner Realty Co., 215 the trustee of a bankrupt real
estate broker sought to recover certain real estate commissions paid
and yet to be paid defendant salesmen of the bankrupt, contending
that the commission agreements in issue were illegal. 206 The bank-
title to the bankrupt's estate.
Id. at 1027.
197. 577 F.2d at 968. See also In re Brissette, 561 F.2d779 (9th Cir. 1977).
198. No. 78-36 (S.D. Fla., filed Aug. 23, 1978). This was a motion to extend the time for
filing an appeal from a decision that § 17a(7) of the Act does not violate the due process clause
because it expressly exempts from discharge only alimony and support "of wife." Id. (July 7,
1978) (date of the motion for summary judgment).
199. FED. R. BANKRUPTCY P. 802(a).
200. Id. 802(c).
201. FED. R. App. P. 4(a).
202. Id.
203. No. 78-36, slip op. at 2.204. Id. See also 9 MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcTIcE 204.13 [11
(2d ed. 1970).
205. No. 76-1094 (M.D. Fla., filed Apr. 10, 1978).
206. The trustee alleged a violation of FLA. STAT. § 475.42(1)(d) (Supp. 1978), which
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rupt had entered into agreements with the seller of certain proper-
ties under which the seller agreed to pay directly the commissions
of the defendant salesmen."0 7 The court distinguished the nature of
the trustee's claim as it related to commissions already received and
commissions yet to be received and paid, and denied the claims.
As to the commissions already received, it was first recognized
that because the commissions were paid to the defendants prior to
the institution of the bankruptcy proceedings, the trustee acquired
no legal or equitable interest in the property under section 70a of
the Actz'" (which vests the rights of the bankrupt in the trustee as
of the date of the filing of the petition). Also, it was noted that
because the bankrupt was not in a position to attack and recover
the commissions already paid, having been a party to the agree-
ments, the trustee was likewise estopped from asserting through
the bankrupt any claim to these monies.10
The question thus became whether the trustee could attack the
money already paid by utilizing one of his voiding powers under
section 60b,110 section 6711 or section 70c.212 The court concluded
that those powers were unavailable because there were no allega-
tions that the payments were voidable preferences under section
60b, a fraudulent transfer under section 67 or that the payments
constituted property to which a jugment lien could have attached
on the date of adjudication enabling the trustee to assert a special
provides in part: "no salesman shall collect any money in connection with any real estate
brokerage transaction, whether as a commission, . . . or otherwise, except in the name of the
employer, and with the express consent of the employer .... "
207. No. 76-1094, slip op. at 2. The agreements also provided for the payment of part of
the commission at the time of closing, with the remainder to be paid over a period of years,
and that the payments to be made directly to the defendant salesmen were to be deemed
payments directly to the bankrupt. Id.
208. Bankruptcy Act § 70a, 11 U.S.C. § 110(a).
209. No. 76-1094, slip op. at 3.
210. Bankruptcy Act § 60b authorizes the trustee to avoid any preference if the creditor
receiving it had, at the time the transfer was made, reasonable cause to believe that the
debtor was insolvent.
211. Bankruptcy Act § 67 operates to void liens obtained by attachment, judgment or
levy within four months before bankruptcy if the lien was obtained when the debtor was
insolvent or if it was sought and permitted in fraud of the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act.
212. Bankruptcy Act § 70c gives the trustee the benefit of all defenses available to the
bankrupt as against third persons. In addition, the trustee is given as of the date of bank-
ruptcy the rights and powers: (1) a judgment lien creditor who obtained his judgment against
the bankrupt on the date of bankruptcy; (2) a creditor who, on the date of bankruptcy, held
an unsatisfied execution against the bankrupt; and (3) a creditor who, on the date of bank-
ruptcy, obtained a lien by legal or equitable proceedings upon all property on which a creditor
of the bankrupt on a simple contract could have obtained such a lien. It is not necessary that
these creditors, in whose shoes the trustee may stand, actually exist.
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lien status under section 70c. 1
This decision left for consideration the voiding power of the
trustee under section 70e(1), 1 ' which permits the trustee to void
transfers affecting the bankrupt's property that are fraudulent as to
an actual creditor under applicable state law. Thus, the trustee
must assert the rights of a creditor of the bankrupt against whom
the particular transfer would have been fraudulent or voidable
under Florida law."' The court held that although section 475.42 of
the Florida Statutes"' prohibited the kind of arrangement entered
into by the parties, it was "not designed to give standing to a credi-
tor of the broker. to attack any assignment like the one involved in
the present controversy, nor to provide him any civil remedy against
the parties to the agreement . ".2.."I" Therefore, under the appli-
cable law there existed no creditor against whom the commission
payments were fraudulent, rendering section 70e(1) inapplicable. 8
As to the unperformed portion of the contract, the court rea-
soned differently. It recognized that in Florida an assignee will pre-
vail over a subsequent creditor of the assignor, so long as the as-
signee can establish the validity of the assignment,"9 and that by
virtue of section 70e the trustee is armed with the voiding powers
of that subsequent creditor. The ultimate quesion was thus whether
Florida courts would assist in the enforcement of an assignment
which was in violation of Florida law. The court held that they
would not, but because proof was lacking as to the existence of an
actual creditor of the bankrupt who could have attacked the assign-
ment, the trustee's motion for summary judgment was deemed pre-
mature and was denied.22
2. CALCULATION OF THE FOUR MONTH PERIOD
Under section 60a(1) of the Act, one of the elements of a prefer-
213. No. 76-1094, slip op. at 4.
214. Bankruptcy Act § 70e(1), 11 U.S.C. § 110(e)(1), provides:
A transfer made or suffered or obligation incurred by a debtor adjudged a
bankrupt under this Act which, under any Federal or State law applicable
thereto, is fraudulent as against or voidable for any other reason by any creditor
of the debtor, having a claim provable under this Act, shall be null and void as
against the trustee of such debtor.
215. See Hartman v. Lauchli, 238 F.2d 881 (8th Cir. 1956); 4A COLLIER, supra note 5,
70.90.
216. See note 206 supra.
217. No. 76-1094, slip op. at 5.
218. Id.
219. Id. slip op. at 7.
220. Id.
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ence is the occurrence of a transfer within four months of the date
of bankruptcy.Y' The four month period is calculated to the calen-
dar month, 2 1 excluding the day the transfer is effected and includ-
ing the day of the filing of the petition.23
These established principles were articulated and properly ap-
plied in In re Amjoe, Inc., 21 where bankruptcy was filed on April 10,
1976, and the transfer alleged that a preference occurred on Decem-
ber 10, 1975. The court correctly held that calculation of the four
month period did not begin to run until December 11, and that
therefore the bankruptcy petition occurred one day prior to the
expiration of the four month period.2
3. BANK SET-OFF
In In re Coleeco, Inc.,221 the court concluded that whether a
bank's set-off is a preference depends on whether, at the time of
acceptance, it was its intention to apply the deposit as a set-off. The
bankrupt owed a bank $18,000 on a note. While the note was delin-
quent, the debtor deposited certain cashier's checks in its account
at the bank. A bank officer accepted the checks, deposited them,
and the next day set off that part of the deposit necessary to satisfy
the delinquent debt. The following day the debtor filed in bank-
ruptcy.
The trustee contended that the bank's set-off action consti-
tuted a preference. The bank argued that its action was permissible
under section 68 of the Act. 22 Though it is true that the trustee bears
the burden of establishing the elements of a voidable preference,228
in the case of a bank set-off the trustee might show that the deposit
was not accepted in the "ordinary course of ,business." In other
words, if the bank accepted. the deposit with an intent to apply it
221. Bankruptcy Act § 60a(1), 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(1). In addition, the transfer must be:
of the property of a debtor to or for the benefit of a creditor for or on account of
an antecedent debt, made or suffered by such debtor while insolvent ...the
effect of which transfer will be to enable such creditor to obtain a greater percen-
tage of his debt than some other creditor ....
222. 3 COLLIER, supra note 5, 60.32. See also In re Custer, 55 F.2d 718 (S.D. Ohio 1931).
The term "month" denotes a period ending with the same numerical day in the next month,
less one day.
223. See Bankruptcy Act § 31, 11 U.S.C. § 54; FED. R. BANKRUPTCY P. 906.
224. No. 76-265 (M.D. Fla., filed Nov. 22, 1977).
225. Id. slip op. at 2.
226. No. 76-723 (M.D. Fla., filed Mar. 13, 1978).
227. See note 152 supra.
228. See Wilkie v. Brooks, 515 F.2d 741 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 996 (1976);
Gentry v. Bodan, 347 F. Supp. 367 (E.D. La. 1972).
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to a preexisting claim rather than to hold it subject to checks, the
deposit is a transfer in violation of section 67 and is therefore a
preference."' 9
The bank relied on Farmer's Bank v. Julian,s° in which the
court distinguished a debtor's account that was built up over several
days, during which time the bank honored numerous checks, and
in which the closing balance (set off by the bank) was less than the
amount owed it. the Coleeco court was not compelled by this ra-
tionale because the circumstances before it (in contrast to those in
Farmer's) indicated that the bank clearly intended to apply the
amount received to the preexisting debt at the time it accepted the
cashier's check for deposit. 3s
B. Escrowed Funds
In In re Bar-Den Enterprises, Inc.,s2 the court held that the
trustee, like the bankrupt, is bound by the terms of an escrow agree-
ment and cannot recover funds paid into escrow. The trustee sought
a turnover of money held in escrow by an S&L, sums which repre-
sented monthly installments for ad valorem taxes paid by the bank-
rupt before filing in bankruptcy. The bankrupt bought real property
at a clerk's sale, subject to a mortgage of the S&L and made pay-
ments on the mortgage for two years.
The trustee contended that the bankrupt was not bound by the
escrow agreement in the mortgage, and that the trustee was entitled
to the funds. The S&L answered that the bankrupt implicitly
agreed to be subject to the terms of the mortgage, including the
escrow payment. This latter argument proved persuasive to the
court. Under section 70, escrow money does not vest in the trustee.
2 3
Further, as observed by the Bar-Den court, under general principles
of bankruptcy law the bankrupt is bound by the terms of the escrow,
and his trustee cannot recover payments made pursuant to them.
C. Leases
In In re North American Marketing Corp.,s3 the court held -that
a car rental lessor cannot avoid liability to third persons, make itself
229. See Kane v. First Nat'l Bank, 56 F.2d 534 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 603
(1932); Miller v. Wells Fargo Bank Int'l Corp., 406 F. Supp. 452 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
230. 383 F.2d 134 (8th Cir. 1967).
231. No. 76-723, slip op. at 4.
232. No. 77-550 (M.D. Fla., filed Mar. 27, 1978).
233. Creel v. Birmingham Trust Nat'l Bank, 383 F. Supp. 871 (N.D. Ala. 1974).
234. No. 77-1157 (S.D. Fla., filed Mar. 17, 1978).
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a secondary insurer of the driver or make the lessee liable to the
lessor as an indemnitor or primary insurer, by virtue of a contract
relieving the insurer of liability for damage done in violation of a
motor vehicle statute. The defendant had rented an automobile
from the debtor, and subsequently had an accident. The parties had
a written agreement under which the lessee was liable for all dam-
ages to the rental vehicle if the lessee used, drove or permitted the
operation of the vehicle in violation of "any motor vehicle stat-
ute."m The lessor provided liability insurance coverage, but stated
that the coverage did not apply if the vehicle was used or driven in
violation of any motor vehicle statute. The same provision applied
to collision insurance.
The debtor's position was that the defendant was liable for his
entire $2,600 claim, while the defendant argued that he was only
liable for the $20 rental charge owing under the rental contract. The
rationale behind the lessor's claim was that the damages arose from
the debtor's operation of the vehicle in violation of a motor vehicle
statute. The court agreed, finding that the damage to the rental
vehicle was caused by the defendant's violative driving. The opinion
pointed out that it is "virtually impossible" to damage an automo-
bile without violating a traffic code, and that the liability and colli-
sion protection was illusory. The plaintiff was entitled to recover
only the rental charge.
X. DISCHARGE
Much bankruptcy litigation involves the question of whether a
debt is nondischargeable because it was obtained through fraud.
The question arises under section 17a of the Act.
A. Fraud in Obtaining Money or Property on Credit
Generally speaking, section 17a exempts from discharge any
provable debt created or obtained by fraud. The statutory provi-
sions also encompass obtaining money or property through false
pretense and obtaining extensions of credit through materially false
written financial statements. 3 Three critical stumbling blocks
exist, however, for the creditor seeking to avoid the discharge of an
indebtedness under section 17: One must show reliance, materiality
and intent to deceive on the part of the debtor. Even a materially
false financial statement is insufficient to avoid, for there must be
235. Id. slip op. at 2.
236. Bankruptcy Act § 17a(2), 11 U.S.C. § 35a (1976).
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an intention to deceive or such reckless disregard for the truth as to
be tantamount to willful misrepresentation.237 Imputed or implied
fraud is not enough; the creditor must prove actual or positive
fraud.2" He must show by clear and convincing evidence that: (1)
the debtor made a false representation; (2) he knew it was false at
the time; (3) he made it with the intention and purpose of deceiving
the creditor; (4) the creditor relied on the representation; and (5)
the creditor sustained loss and damages as a proximate result of the
misrepresentation."'
During 1977 and 1978, the courts ruled on several aspects re-
garding the concept of fraud under section 17. There was a reaffir-
mation that a bankruptcy court will only go beyond the record in
state court proceedings in extraordinary cases in order to ascertain
whether fraud exists in a section 17 proceeding.240 A finding of such
fraud requires evidence of fraudulent intent. It was held that where
a debtor consulted with an attorney concerning bankruptcy four
days after obtaining a loan, that fact justified the inference of the
requisite intent .24 Further, reliance by the creditor on a false repre-
sentation as to what the bankrupt would do in the future is fraudu-
lent under section 17a(2) only where the borrower used cunning and
artifice to deceive the lender who materially relied upon the mis-
representations and was thereby induced to provide the loan."'
And where a bank loan officer exceeds. his authority in granting a
loan, he cannot thereby be held to have imputed knowledge of the
applicant-bankrupt's "confession" as to the inaccuracy of the fiuan-
cial statement submitted to the bank so as to preclude a denial of
discharge on the debt.
B. Provability
Because only provable debts are dischargeable under section
17a,21 a nonprovable debt cannot be the subject of a section 17
237. See In re Starr Parker, No. 75-870 (M.D. Fla., filed July 19, 1976). United States
v. Syros, 254 F. Supp. 195 (E.D. Mo. 1966).
238. What must be shown is "proof of cunning, deceit or artifice employed to circumvent,
to cheat or to deceive another." Avco Fin. Servs. v. Jackson, No. 75-592 (M.D. Fla., filed Apr.
8, 1976), quoted in Gilbert & Pass, Bankruptcy, 1976 Developments in Florida Law, 31 U.
Mi~mi L. Rav. 791, 827, n.154 (1977). See also Public Fin. Corp. v. Taylor, 514 F.2d 1370 (9th
Cir. 1975).
239. Public Fin. Corp. v. Taylor, 514 F.2d at 1373.
240. See In re Coburn, No. 77-93 (M.D. Fla., filed Dec. 1, 1977).
241. See In re Smith, No. 77-213 (M.D. Fla., filed Nov. 21, 1977).
242. Id.
243. See In re Everhart, No. 76-550 (M.D. Fla., filed Apr. 14, 1978).
244. Section 17a provides that "a discharge in bankruptcy shall release the bankrupt
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proceeding. In In re Rigby,"' the defendant filed a voluntary peti-
tion in bankruptcy before entrance of a final judgment of dissolution
of marriage by the state court, which incorporated a prior property
settlement agreement between the parties. The wife sought a deter-
mination that the debt owed pursuant to the judgment would not
be discharged in bankruptcy. The court granted the defendant a
summary judgment, reasoning that to be provable in bankruptcy,
debts must have been absolutely due and owing at the filing of the
bankruptcy petition. The property settlement was not effective
prior to the final judgment, and therefore not a provable debt; con-
sequently, any debts owed by the defendant to the plaintiff under
the separation agreement were not affected by bankruptcy.
C. Conversion
Section 17a(2) excludes liabilities for the "willful and malicious
conversion" of property. In re Sav-More Oil, Inc. 246 involved inter-
esting questions under subsections 17a(2) and (4). The debtor was
a wholesaler of fuel products who, during the gasoline shortage of
early 1976, contracted with several retail operators to maintain for
them a prepaid account in order to assure that they would receive
gasoline when they needed it. When Say-More proved unable to pay
its bill, the supplier completely cut off its gasoline allocation leaving
the debtor with insufficient supplies to provide the gasoline which
it owed Fireline Petroleum, Inc. (Fireline), one of its prepaid cus-
tomers. In order to extricate itself from these difficulties, Sav-More
induced the defendant, Eastern, to purchase gasoline from another
supplier, Colonial, to whom Sav-More owed a preexistent debt.
When the time came for delivery, Colonial satisfied that debt by
"light-loading" the barge (failing to deliver an amount equal in
value to the debt owed). Sav-More also withheld a large quantity
of gasoline from Eastern, providing some to Fireline to satisfy its
demand, and keeping the rest for its own use. The end result was
that Eastern received only 41,506 gallons of gasoline for $123,984
paid by way of certified check. Eastern therefore brought suit under
section 17a(2) and (4) in order to prevent discharge of the debt owed
it (i.e., the difference between the value of the gasoline delivered
and the amount of the check).
The plaintiff pursued two theories-breach of a duty owed by
from all -of his provable debts, whether allowable in full or in part, except [as provided in
cases of fraud] . . . . " Section 63 of the Act lists the debts which may be proven.
245. No. 77-673 (M.D. Fla., filed May 16, 1978).
246. No. 76-727 (M.D. Fla., filed Dec. 12, 1977).
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a fiduciary to the principal and conversion. The court ascertained
that, as Eastern had a special ownership interest, or at least a pos-
sessory right, to the property in question, it clearly had standing to
maintain suit based on the latter theory. This right was grounded
upon a finding of a principal-agent relationship between Eastern
and Sav-More in the dealings with Colonial, arising due to the en-
trustment of money to be used for a specific purpose. 47
The court allowed recovery in part, and denied it in part, under
both theories. The actions of Say-More constituted both a breach
of fiduciary duty and a conversion of Eastern's goods. As to that
portion withheld by Colonial, however, the court failed to find ade-
quate proof, as required by section 17a(2), of willful and malicious
intent to convert 48 as Colonial, rather than the defendant, had initi-
ated the light-loading.
D. Projected Profits and Earnings
In re Gaboru' illustrated the dangers of becoming extensively
involved in a deal accompanied by misrepresentation. The plaintiff
sought to avoid the discharge of an obligation which supposedly
arose through false representations made by the bankrupt in
connection with an agreement under which the plaintiffs obtained
an interest in a company engaged in building apartments. The al-
leged misrepresentations concerned the projected profits of the
apartments and the fairness of the purchase price.
210
Even assuming that these statements were misleading, the
court denied recovery under section 17 because the plaintiffs had
bargained, with the aid of counsel, for the final assignment agree-
ment which "specifically and unambiguously disavow[ed]" the
substance of the alleged misrepresentations. In the words of the
court, "should misleading statements have been made, provisions
of this agreement would negate any meaningful or justifiable reli-
ance on such statements . . . [e]ven assuming such misrepresen-
tations there could be no reliance due to the availability of counsel
and the express terms of the agreement." 251 Because the plaintiffs
247. See Hamby v. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 217 F.2d 78 (4th Cir. 1954);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 13 (1957).
248. No. 76-727, slip op. at 5.
249. No. 76-705 (M.D. Fla., filed Feb. 10, 1978).
250. Gabor represented to the plaintiffs that they would be buying 10% of Caralee Build-
ing Company,. that $100,000 was a fair price for such interest, and that the money would be
used to complete construction of the apartments. Id. slip op. at 4.
251. Id. slip op. at 5.
1979]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LA W REVIEW
failed to meet their burden of proof,252 the court refused to "relieve
them from the terms of an improvident deal." '253
E. Failure to Disclose the Purpose of a Loan
In In re Thomas,254 the bankrupt submitted a financial state-
ment that did not list all her debts. 5 There was a dispute as to
whether an employee of the plaintiff's finance company told the
bankrupt that she did not have to list all her debts. The matters not
listed were: (1) that there was a furniture loan outstanding, and (2)
that the reason this loan was being taken out was to finance a car
that had been repossessed. The court held that while the "omission
of liabilities alone might not warrant any inference of falsity," '256 the
failure to advise as to the reposession of the automobile compelled
the conclusion that the debtor evidenced thereby the requisite spe-
cific intent to deceive, as "it was obviously designed to mislead in
light of the purpose of the new loan." '257
F. Attorney's Fees
The Thomas court also faced the question of whether a finance
company should be awarded attorney's fees for obtaining a judg-
ment of nondischargeability of the debt. Th6 note called for the
assessment of reasonable attorney's fees where counsel is hired to
collect the note. The court held, relying on In re Legge,2 5 that
attorney's fees were allowable but were dischargeable. In Legge,
as in this case, the court reasoned that section 17a(2) is founded in
tort, and that an award of attorney's fees would not be proper in an
action to collect a note for breach of contract.259
G. Credit Cards: Absence of Affirmative
Misrepresentation
In In re Wood, "I the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit came
close to overruling the "affirmative act" requirement of Davison-
252. The record showed that the proof was "in equilibrium." Id. slip op. at 6.
253. Id., slip op. at 7.
254. No. 77.739 (M.D. Fla., filed Mar. 21, 1978).
255. The instructions on the financial statement clearly required a listing of all debts.
256. Id. slip op. at 4.
257. The loan was obtained in order to secure a down payment for a new automobile to
replace the repossession.
258. 3 B.C.D. 1299 (M.D. Fla. 1977).
259. No. 77-739, slip op. at 5.
260. 571 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1978).
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Paxon Co. v. Caldwell,2 ' by holding that a revolving charge account
customer who purchases goods and later cannot pay for them is not
subject to a denial of discharge. The court declined to reexamine the
requirement, holding merely that a revolving charge account cus-
tomer who purchases goods and cannot pay for them is not subject
to nondischarge under section 17a(2) so long as there is no evidence
that he did not intend not to pay for them when he charged them.
262
The court specifically stated that it need not reach the issue of
whether Davison-Paxon is still viable, because there was no evi-
dence that the bankrupt did not intend to pay for the merchandise
or that he fraudulently concealed his financial condition. 63
In In re Phifer,211 however, the southern district joined the mid-
dle district in concluding that the affirmative misrepresentation
rule of Davison-Paxon is no longer valid. Relying on the recent
observation of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit that the
rule may be questionable, 2 the court held that although a finding
of actual intent to defraud is essential in a section 17a(2) proceed-
ing, that intent may be inferred where a bankrupt makes credit card
purchases when he clearly has no intention of paying for them.
2
1
In In re Benoit,211 the court held that so long as the debtor
intended to pay for what she bought, the fact that her expectations
were unreasonable would not suffice to satisfy the fraudulent intent
standard of section 17a(2). The bankrupt obtained $3,000 from her
VISA card and used it to buy a Cadillac. She explained that she had
bought the Cadillac in order to resell it in Canada, where she ex-
pected to make a big profit which she could use to repay VISA and
still have a little money remaining. Unfortunately for her, the
scheme did not succeed and the car was repossessed. She went
voluntarily to a credit counseling service, which recommended that
she file in bankruptcy. Instead of following that advice, the bank-
rupt went to Puerto Rico and gambled for two weeks. She explained
that she expected to win enough to pay her debts.
While it was conceded that, however incredible, the bankrupt
did intend in good faith to repay her debt, the. plaintiff argued that
the debts should nonetheless not be dischargeable, because the ex-
pectations of the bankrupt were so incredible and unreasonable.
261. 115 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1940).
262. 571 F.2d at 285.
263. Id.
264. No. 78-473 (S.D. Fla., filed Sept. 19, 1978).
265. See In re Boydston, 520 F.2d 1098 (5th Cir. 1975).
266. No. 78-473, slip op. at 4.
267. No. 78-425 (S.D. Fla., filed Sept. 8, 1978).
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The court disagreed, based on the fact that "the essential element
in plaintiff's case under § 17a(2) is the bankrupt's actual intent,"2 '
and that the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate the defendant's
intent to defraud. While the essential "subjective intent" may be
inferred from the circumstances, the court held that the plaintiff
had failed to meet his burden, and therefore, dismissed the com-
plaint with prejudice."'
H. "Going Behind" the Record to Find Fraud
In In re McCracken,"27 the court held that, while the bankruptcy
court may not "go behind" a state court judgment to find fraud, the
fact that a claim has been reduced to judgment does not preclude
inquiry as to fraud in the obligation behind it."'I The court was
asked to "go behind" a state court judgment to determine if that
judgment was based on fraud, so as to prevent dischargeability of
the debt under section 17. The complaint filed in state court was
"for breach of contract.""27 The alleged basis for the suit was that
the defendant-bankrupt falsely represented that he was licensed as
a home improvement contractor and was bonded. The defendant-
bankrupt argued that the record in the state court proceeding
showed only a breach of contract action, and that the plaintiffs were
thereby estopped from asserting that the underlying basis of the
debt was fraud.
Noting that the courts had resolved the question of whether the
bankruptcy court could "go behind" the record and attempt to find
fraud in a state court proceeding, the bankruptcy court nevertheless
concluded that those cases "did not provide a guide" for resolution
of the issue.7 3 Referring to the general principle that "the obtaining
of a judgment does not alter the nondischargeability of a claim," 74
the court went on to determine that issue itself. To do otherwise,
the court observed, would be to "frustrate the very purpose of the
law, which was to prevent the bankrupt from retaining the benefits
of property acquired by fraudulent means."275 Accordingly, the
bankrupt's motion for summary judgment was denied.
268. Id. slip op. at 2.
269. Id. slip op. at 3.
270. No. 77-745 (M.D. Fla., filed May 15, 1978).
271. See Thomas v. Crosby, 146 F. Supp. 296, 299 (W.D. Mo. 1956).
272. No. 77-745, slip op. at 2.
273. Id.
274. Id.




Section 516.18, Florida Statutes, requires that a small loan
company consolidate all prior loans into a new one to assure that
no greater rate of interest than that allowed by law is charged. Thus,
each time a customer of a small loan company applies for a new
loan, there will be some "fresh cash" (the amount of the new loan)
which exceeds the payoff on the prior loans. A "fresh cash" problem
arises in bankruptcy under section 17 where there is no claim of
fraud in connection with the new loan. In each case, absent evidence
that the prior loan was obtained by fraud, the courts have held that
only the "fresh cash" is nondischargeable under section 17a(2).111
J. Conversion
1. PRE-PETITION ACTS
In In re Wooten," ' the court held that there can be no conver-
sion between spouses. Furthermore, a divorced spouse could not
employ section 17a(2) to deny the dischargeability of a debt owed
to her due to the conversion of her property by her former spouse
during marriage, because a suit between husband and wife based on
conversion, upon which the claim of nondischargeability in section
17a(2) is founded, is barred in Florida by the doctrine of inter-
spousal immunity.7 8 The doctrine has been severely criticized, par-
ticularly with regard to the prohibition against suits between di-
vorced spouses for torts committed during the former marriage. " ,
2. POST-PETITION ACTS
In Love v. Tower Loan,2"' the court recognized that postbank-
ruptcy acts of the debtor causing a loss of collateral are not grounds
276. See In re Ellis, 400 F. Supp. 1112 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); In re Fuhrman, 385 F. Supp.
1185 (W.D.N.Y. 1973); In re Schuerrman, 367 F. Supp. 1347 (E.D. Ky. 1973); In re Soika,
365 F. Supp. 555 (W.D.N.Y. 1973).
Similarly, in In re Ward, No. 76-97 (M.D. Fla., filed Nov. 28, 1977), it was held that
where fraud is evidenced in a new loan consolidating other loans, only that portion of the new
loan which represents an amount greater than the sum of the prior loans will not be dis-
charged.
277. No. 77-364 (M.D. Fla., filed May 8, 1978).
278. See Bencomo v. Bencomo, 200 So. 2d 171 (Fla. 1967); Corren v. Corren, 47 So. 2d
774 (Fla. 1950); Easterly v. Wildman, 87 Fla. 73, 99 So. 359 (1924).
279. See generally Doyle v. Doyle, 307 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975) (Mager, J.,
concurring); Bencomo v. Bencomo, 200 So. 2d 171, 174 (Fla. 1967) (Irvin, J., dissenting);
Note, Interspousal Immunity in Torts: Its Relevance, Constitutionality, and Role in Conflict
with Laws, 21 U. FLA. L. REv. 484 (1969).
280. 577 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1978).
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for denying discharge. In Love, a creditor objected to the discharge
of a certain debt because, after bankruptcy, the bankrupt had
wasted the collateral securing the creditor's note. The Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit specifically held that a showing of post-
bankruptcy waste of collateral by the debtor did not satisfy the
requirement of section 17a(2) that the debt whose discharge is op-
posed must arise from the bankrupt's act which created liability for
willful and malicious conversion of property of another.",
K. Fraud by a Fiduciary
In In re Bruno, 0 the bankrupt borrowed $18,000 from the plain-
tiff and failed to repay it. The proceeding was brought to determine
the dischargeability of the debt. The plaintiff-creditor claimed that
the debt was not dischargeable because: (1) it was not "duly sched-
uled in time for proof and allowance"; (2) it was obtained by the
fraud of a person "acting . . . in any fiduciary capacity"; and, (3)
it was orally reaffirmed by the bankrupt during bankruptcy. ,
The court rejected all of these contentions. Although the debt
was not duly scheduled, the plaintiff-creditor had actual knowledge
of it in time to file a proof of claim. Thus, no section 17a(3) grounds
existed.28 ' In addition, no section 17a(4) (fraud by fiduciary) viola-
tion arose because the fiduciary status alleged was that of close
personal confidence to the plaintiff, and, as noted by the court, "it
is settled beyond present dispute that section 17a(4) applie[s] only
to fiduciaries of technical or express trusts, not to all fiduciaries."2
The plaintiff's evidence failed to establish a reaffirmation of the
debt, thereby warranting dismissal of the complaint with prejudice
and a determination that the debt owed by the bankrupt to the
plaintiff was discharged in bankruptcy. 28
L. Revival by Oral Reaffirmation
Acknowledging that oral reaffirmation can revive the debt so
long as the statute of limitations has not run on it, the Bruno court
held that no reaffirmation occurred in these circumstances.2 87 To be
281. Id. at 347.
282. No. 75-1488 (S.D. Fla., filed July 6, 1978).
283. Id. slip op. at 3.
284. Section 17a(3) provides in part that a debt "not duly scheduled" is not discharged,
"unless such creditor had notice or actual knowledge of the proceedings in bankruptcy."
285. See In re Thornton, 544 F.2d 1005 (9th Cir. 1976); Taitch v. Lavoy, 360 P.2d 588
(Wash. 1961).




enforceable, the reaffirmation must be definite, express, distinct
and unambiguous. Neither the simple assertion that there was no
need for filing a claim because the bankrupt intended to pay it nor
the mere acknowledgement of the debt, or expression of hope or
expectation of paying it, suffices. Similarly, a partial payment made
after the bankrupt's discharge will not serve as a new promise
sufficient to revive the debt.2
M. Alimony and Support
1. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE BAR ON
"WIFE" SUPPORT DISCHARGE
Section 17a(7) bars the discharge of any liability "for alimony
• . . or for maintenance or support of wife or child. ' 8 In In re
Baird,2 a case of first impression in Florida, the court upheld the
constitutionality of the bankruptcy barrier of discharge for judg-
ments ordering support for a "wife." A wife was awarded child sup-
port and'alimony and sought a determination that the whole obliga-
tion was nondischargeable, as provided by section 17a(7). The bank-
rupt's only argument was that the section is invalid because it is
discriminatorily based on sex. The court noted that there is a
nationwide split of authority concerning this issue. One court has
held the classification unconstitutional,3 ' while another court
has upheld it.2 One has simply read the word "wife" to mean
spouse."'
The court observed that there was no discrimination at all as
to alimony, as the Wasserman and Pinkerton decisions have held.29'
The only sex-based distinction arises in allowances of "maintenance
or support."' The court concluded that even reading the classifica-
tion literally, its decision was justified by the reasoning in Kahn v.
Shevin.3 6 Furthermore, assuming arguendo that the classification
was invidiously discriminatory, the court declared that it would
indeed exercise its power to extend the scope of the statute to in-
288. Id. (citing 1A CoLLIER, supra note 5, 17.37).
In In re Glass, 577 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1978), the court held that the bankruptcy court
has no jurisdiction to determine whether there has been reaffirmation of the debt.
289. Bankruptcy Act § 17a(7), 11 U.S.C. § 35(a) (1976).
290. No. 78-36 (S.D. Fla., filed July 7, 1978).
291. See In re Wasserman, 3 B.C.D. 467 (D.R.I. 1977).
292. In re Crist, No. 77-1759 (N.D. Ga., filed May 16, 1978).
293. In re Pinkerton, 4 B.C.D. 182 (N.D. Ga. 1978).
294. No. 78-36, slip op. at 3.
295. Id.
296. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
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clude court awards made to husbands, rather than completely deny
the relief to wives.
297
2. ALIMONY
In In re Thackston,298 the court held that although the debt
raised under a property settlement agreement is dischargeable, an
agreement affecting the husband's duty to support the wife is, in
substance, one for alimony, and therefore not dischargeable.2 9 As
part of their marriage dissolution, the parties entered into a contract
called a "separation and property settlement agreement."300 It pro-
vided for custody and support of a child, as well as alimony for the
wife. The alimony was to be paid during the life of the husband until
the wife died or remarried. The marital home was sold and the net
proceeds applied to reimburse each party for their attorney's fees in
connection with the dissolution.
Despite the arrangement's being called a property settlement
agreement, and the court's own recognition that "liabilities arising
out of a property settlement agreement are dischargeable," 301 the
court held thatithe substance of the agreement fell within section
17a(7) because it was sufficiently similar to an award of alimony
the court itself might have made. The court emphasized that
the agreement was primarily designed to ensure the maintenance
and support of the wife. 02 Furthermore, the agreement recognized
that the monthly payment was insufficient to support the wife, and
that while the use of the proceeds from the sale of the home to pay
attorney's fees might "appear to be a property settlement," attor-
ney's fees and costs awarded as part of a final judgment of divorce
are "necessary" and are within the scope of section 17a(7). 3
297. A Florida statute grants widows an annual $500 property tax exemption. Appellant,
a widower, was denied an exemption because the statute offers no analogous benefits for
widowers. The Supreme Court of the United States held that the challenged tax law is
reasonably designed to further the state policy of cushioning the financial impact of spousal
loss upon the sex for whom that loss imposes a disproportionately heavy burden.
298. No. 77-341 (M.D. Fla., filed May 2, 1978).
299. Id. In Audubon v. Shufeldt, the Supreme Court of the United States observed that:
"Alimony does not arise from a business transaction, but from a relation of marriage. It is
not founded on contract, express or implied, but on a natural and legal duty of the husband
to support the wife." 181 U.S. 575, 577 (1901).
300. Id. slip op. at 1.
301. Id.
302. Id. slip op. at 2.
303. See Pelusio v. Pelusio, 130 N.J. Super. 538, 328 A.2d 10 (1974) (per curiam).
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3. AWARDS OF ATTORNEY'S FEES PENDENTE LITE
In In re Bliss,04 the issue before the court was whether an award
to the wife of attorney's fees pendente lite in a dissolution action
that was never concluded is nondischargeable under section 17a(7).
Generally speaking, the answer is obvious: awards of attorney's fees
in dissolutions are within section 17a(7).3°5 The statute, however, is
not free from question, particularly in view of its arguably tenuous
constitutional basis." 6 In Bliss, the attorney's fees award was never
made part of the final decree. Nevertheless, the court found that an
award pendente lite is "part and parcel of the husband's obligation
to support the wife" and held it nondischargeable. 07
4. ATTORNEY'S FEES AWARDED TO ATTORNEY
In In re Thackston, 30 the court held that an attorney who had
obtained an award of attorney's fees in a dissolution action under
section 61.16 of the Florida Statutes (1975),101 could bring an action
under section 17a(7) to determine the dischargeability of the debt.
5. SCOPE OF "ALIMONY" AND "SUPPORT"
In In re Singley,311 the court held that a divorce settlement
requiring the husband to repay a loan cannot be declared nondis-
chargeable as "alimony" at the instance of a creditor. The bankrupt
and his spouse had secured a loan from the plaintiff, and were later
divorced. The divorce decree ordered the bankrupt to repay the loan
due to the plaintiff, specifically stating that the wife should be held
exempt from responsibility for the debt.31'
After the husband filed in bankruptcy, the creditor sought to
have the debt declared nondischargeable pursuant to section 17a(7)
of the Act, which renders debts "for alimony" nondischargeable.
The bankrupt argued that the creditor had no standing to seek such
a ruling from the court; only the divorced wife has that prerogative.
304. No. 77-429 (M.D. Fla., filed Sept. 25, 1977).
305. Allison v. Allison, 372 P.2d 946 (Colo. 1962); Turner v. Turner, 108 F. 785 (D. Ind.
1901); Pelusio v. Pelusio, 130 N.J. Super. 538, 328 A.2d 10 (1974) (per curiam). See also
Novack v. Novack, 210 So. 2d 215 (Fla. 1968).
306. See In re Wasserman, 3 B.C.D. 467 (D.R.I. 1977).
307. No. 77-429, slip op. at 1 (quoting Norris v. Norris, 324 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1963)).
308. No. 77-341 (M.D. Fla., filed May 2, 1978).
309. That statutory section provides in part: "The court may ... after considering the
financial resources of both parties, order a party to pay a reasonable amount for attorney's
fees . . . to the other party . . . . The court may order that the amount be paid directly to
the attorney, who may enforce the order in his name."
310. No. 77-701 (M.D. Fla., filed Mar. 30, 1978).
311. Id. slip op. at 3.
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Relying on Household Finance Corp. v. Cornfert,312 the bankruptcy
court agreed. It observed that section 17a(7) "was intended to bene-
fit the former wife and children of a bankrupt, not to aid a creditor
of any class in the recovery of its debt.
'" 313
N. Taxes
Section 6672 of the Internal Revenue Code31' imposes what it
calls a "penalty" on any person who fails in his responsibility to
collect withholding (payroll) taxes and pay them over to the govern-
ment. The "penalty" is equal to the total taxes not withheld or paid
over. It may be imposed not only on the corporate employer who
fails in his responsibility, but also on the corporate officer or em-
ployee who is responsible for carrying out the directive of section
6672.315
For several years federal courts have grappled with the question
of whether the liability imposed on the individual corporate em-
ployee is a "tax" or a "penalty." The difference is significant if the
employee files in bankruptcy, because in bankruptcy, "taxes" are
not dischargeable but "penalties" are.316 In 1976, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit decided that section 6672 does indeed levy
a tax, and that the liability imposed is therefore nondischarge-
able.3 7 The Seventh Circuit, however, reached the opposite result
in United States v. Sotelo,15 a case to which the Supreme Court
granted certiorari.
The Court settled the question in a five to four decision. 31 A
majority of the Court reasoned that section 6672 really imposed a
"tax," but that it is made nondischargeable by section 17a(1)(e) 30
of the Act. That subsection provides in part:311
A discharge in bankruptcy shall release the bankrupt from all of
his provable debts, . . . except (1) ...taxes which became le-
gally due and owing by the bankrupt to the United States...
within three years preceding bankruptcy: Provided, however,
312. 6 B.C.D. 34 (W.D. Wis. 1975).
313. No. 77-701, slip op. at 3.
314. 26 U.S.C. § 6672 (Supp. 1979).
315. Id. § 6671(b) (1978).
316. See Gilbert & Pass, Bankruptcy, 1976 Survey of Florida Law, 31 U. MIAMI L. REv.
791, 815-17 (1977).
317. Murphy v. I.R.S., 533 F.2d 940 (5th Cir. 1976).
318. 551 F.2d 1090 (7th Cir.), rev'd, 436 U.S. 268 (1978).
319. 436 U.S. 268 (1978).
320. Bankruptcy Act § 17a(1)(e), 11 U.S.C. § 35(a) (1976).
321. 436 U.S. at 274-75 (emphasis added).
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that a discharge in bankruptcy shall not release the bankrupt
from any taxes. . .(e) which the bankrupt has collected or with-
held from others as required by the laws of the United States
., but has not paid over .
The majority found it "difficult to understand how the court
below could have recognized [the employee-bankrupt's] § 6672 lia-
bility . . . and nonetheless have concluded that he was not
'obligated by law to collect. . .the taxes.' "322 The majority claimed
additional support from specific legislative history which preceded
the 1966 amendment that created section 17a(1)(e). Particularly
persuasive was a letter from the Treasury Department to the Sen-
ate Judiciary Committee emphasizing the undesirability of allowing
people charged with paying withholding taxes to be relieved of their
obligations in bankruptcy when they have converted those monies
to their own use. Thus, the majority found that section 17a(1)(e)
''was specifically intended to meet the objection of Treasury to the
discharge of so-called trust fund taxes. '323
In a dissent by Justice Rehnquist, however, four members of the
Court seriously questioned the majority's conclusion.2 ' According to
Justice Rehnquist, the exception provided by section 17a(1)(e) does
not apply unless the threshold requirement of section 17a(1) is satis-
fied. Section 17a(1) prohibits the discharge of obligations for "taxes
. .. legally due and owing by the bankrupt to the United States
... ,I'35 The dissent would have concluded that section 17a(1) was
not satisfied because the tax was not a tax due and owing by the
bankrupt corporate officer in the first place.2 6 No provision of the
Internal Revenue Code makes the corporate employee liable for the
withheld amounts as a tax; the liability of the employee is men-
tioned only in section 6672, which does not purport to impose a
"tax," but only a "penalty" for not collecting and paying over some-
one else's taxes.327 Justice Rehnquist would have limited section
17a(1)(e) to the corporate employer, not its officers or employees. In
addition, the dissent argued that, because section 6672 calls itself a
"penalty," Congress should be presumed to have meant what it said
in enacting the statute.3 2s
322. Id.
323. Id. at 277.
324. Id. at 282-92 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
325. Id. at 283 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(1) (1976)).
326. Id.
327. 436 U.S. at 283; I.R.C. § 6672 (1954).
328. The dissent also concluded that the rationale of the majority was contrary to the
central purpose of the Bankruptcy Act, which is to allow bankrupts to achieve a "fresh start."
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One of the principal arguments supporting the view that sec-
tion 6672 imposes a tax and not a penalty is that all that the govern-
ment receives is the amount of the tax; that is, the tax merely
compensates the government for its "pecuniary loss. ' '311 The new
Bankruptcy Act, which becomes effective, in general, on October 1,
1979, does not discharge a debt: 30
To the extent such debt is for a fine, penalty, or forfeiture payable
to. . .a governmental unit, and is not compensation for actual
pecuniary loss, other than a tax penalty-
(1). for a tax ...
(A) of the kind. . . specified in Section. . .507(a)(6) ...
(B) imposed with respect to a transaction or event that oc-
curred [within three years of the petition in bankruptcy] ....
Section 507(A)(6)(c) refers to "a tax required to be collected
and withheld and for which the debtor is liable in whatever capacity
.... .. (emphasis added). Thus, it appears that the new Bank-
ruptcy Act will legislatively confirm the Sotelo decision.
, 0. Effect of Discharge
A discharge in bankruptcy releases the personal liabilities of
the bankrupt. A valid lien on its property that is not otherwise
avoided remains enforceable.33" ' This principle was applied in In re
Smith, 12 where the court held that a discharge does not reach prop-
erty subject to an in rem action. A bank-creditor sought an order
modifying the bankruptcy discharge granted an individual to enable
the bank to proceed against real property held by the discharged
bankrupt and his wife as tenants by the entireties. The court held
that the bank was free to pursue such property, despite the dis-
charge .3
Interestingly, the bankrupt contended that the creditor's fail-
ure to seek a modification of the automatic stay before the expira-
Justice Rehnquist found it unsurprising that the Treasury Department would recommend as
it did, but found it surprising that the majority could conclude that Congress did what
Treasury recommended, although it had been pointed out to the committee considering the
bill that the bill only referred to ,taxes and not to penalties. 436 U.S. at 287-88.
329. See 31 U. MIAMI L. Rxv., at 816 and cases cited therein.
330. Pub. L. 95-598, 95th Cong., at 402 (emphasis added).
331. Section 14f of the Act operates "to discharge the debt" and to enjoin creditors from
"instituting ... any action. . . to collect such debts as personal liabilities of the bankrupt."
See Binnick v. Avco Financial Servs., 435 F. Supp. 359, 363 (D. Neb. 1977) (quoting, in part
§ 14f(2) of the Act).
332. No. 77-279 (M.D. Fla., filed Jan. 25, 1978).
333. Id. slip op. at 3.
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tion of the date fixed by the bankruptcy court to file a complaint
on discharge was fatal to'his claim. The court rejected that argu-
ment, observing that the date so fixed is not a statute of limitations
and is subject to modification by the court."' The court also pointed
out that the time limitations fixed by rule 409(a)(2) 35 pertain only
to complaints filed under section 17c(2) of the Act. Rule 409(a)(1)
provides that a complaint filed on any other grounds can be filed
at any time.3s The court held that the power to grant requests to
reopen estates or vacate orders lies in the sound discretion of the
bankruptcy court."7
P. Voluntary Dismissal of Dischargeability Action
In In re Amaral,33 the court held that a plaintiff who had filed
a section 14c(2) action (to deny the bankrupt a discharge for failure
to keep adequate books) could not state in his pretrial stipulation
that he would not proceed under that section and thereby circum-
vent the provisions of bankruptcy rule 741.131 Rule 741 provides that
a complaint objecting to a bankrupt's discharge cannot be dis-
missed on the plaintiff's motion, except upon notice to the trustee
and on order of the court containing such terms and conditions as
the court deems proper.340 The court held that the pretrial stipula-
tion was nothing more than an attempted voluntary dismissal with-
out an order of the court and without notice to the trustee and was
therefore ineffective.34 1
XI. ATTORNEY'S FEES
A. Reasonableness of Criteria Employed
The bankrupt's lawyer is the "court's favorite object for fur-
334. Id.
335. Rule 409(a)(2) provides that a complaint filed to determine the dischargeability of
any debt pursuant to § 17c(2) must be filed not less than 30 or more than 90 days after the
first date set for the first meeting of creditors. Section 17c(2) proceedings involve challenges
under § 17a(2) [obtaining money or property by false pretenses, a materially false financial
statement, or conversion], 17a(4) [fraud, embezzlement or misappropriation while acting as
an officer or in any fiduciary capacity], or 17a(8) [malicious injury to property and conver-
sion].
336. FED. R. BANKRUPTCY P. 409(a)(1).
337. See Texas W. Financial Corp. v. McCraw Candies, Inc., 347 F. Supp. 445 (N.D.
Tex. 1972).
338. No. 78-221 (S.D. Fla., filed Sept. 28, 1978).
339. Id. slip op. at 6.
340. FED. R. BANKRUPTCY P. 741.
341. No. 78-221 (S.D. Fla., filed Sept. 28, 1978).
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thering the principle of economy . ... "342 Prompted by the deci-
sions of the Fifth Circuit in American Bnefit Life Insurance Co. v.
Braddock"' and Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc.,311 the
bankruptcy courts have become increasingly concerned with the
fees of attorneys representing the bankrupt and debtor. The goal of
the courts is to ensure that bankrupt estates may be administered
efficiently and economically and "the cost of bankruptcy should not
itself consume the very res the proceedings are designed to pro-
tect.""'
Most individual fee applications turn on their own facts and do
not merit individual discussion. Certain general principles are, how-
ever, reiterated and reaffirmed annually. For instance, Georgia
Highway Express stipulates that the bankruptcy court must con-
sider twelve factors in its determination of a reasonable attorney's
fee. Those factors are: 3
(1) The time and labor required; (2) The novelty and difficulty
of the questions; (3) The skill requisite to perform the duties; (4)
The preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to ac-
ceptance of the case; (5) The customary fee [for the work done];
(6) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) Time limitations
imposed by the client or by other circumstances; (8) The amount
involved and the results obtained; (9) The experience, reputa-
tion, and ability of the attorney; (10) The "undesirability" of the
case; (11) The nature and length of the professional relationship
with the client; (12) Awards in similar cases.
Bankruptcy judges and district courts usually have broad discretion
in setting attorney's fees, and their determinations will not be dis-
turbed absent an abuse of discretion.3 47 The decision of the Fifth
Circuit in Braddock requires that, in setting fees, the judge be
"particularly diligent in setting forth the facts that support [his]
conclusion." 48
342. In re TMP, Inc., No. 76-95 (M.D. Fla., filed Oct. 25, 1977), slip op. at 2.
343. 544 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1977).
344. 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974).
345. No. 76-95, slip op. at 2. See also Jacobowitz v. Double Seven Corp., 378 F.2d 405
(9th Cir. 1967).
346. American Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Braddock, 544 F.2d at 1298-99 (quoting Johnson
v. Georgia Highway Express, 488 F.2d at 717-19).
347. See, e.g., Morgan v. Walter Heller & Co., 434 F.2d 998 (5th Cir. 1970); Massachu-
setts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Brock, 405 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1968).
348. American Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Braddock, 544 F.2d at 1298. The Braddock court
noted that, because of the peculiar nature of bankruptcy, attorneys do not expect to be




It should be remembered that attorney's fees are only allowable
from the bankrupt estate as first priority "administrative expenses"
under section 64a(1).311 Compensable services are those which "have
aided in the administration of the estate, that is to say they must
have assisted the bankrupt in performing his legal duties, not in
exercising his legal privilege."350 Services volunteered or rendered
without clear authorization are not compensable.
An application of some of these principles arose in In re TMP,
Inc.15'In that case, two counsel for a single bankrupt assisted the
bankrupt in obtaining some of his accounts receivable. The amounts
recovered were relatively small in comparison to the size of the total
accounts receivable. The trustee sought reexamiriation of the attor-
neys' fees paid in connection and in contemplation of bankruptcy
under section 60(d), which authorizes the court to examine the
transaction between an attorney and a bankrupt, even if it occurred
prior to bankruptcy, if it was done "directly or indirectly in contem-
plation of the filing of a petition .... "352
After reciting the litany of the rules designed to reduce the
amount paid to the attorney, the court in TMP held that fees paid
which amounted to approximately $65.00 an houi,*were reasonable.
The court noted that this result was required even though a refund
of the comparatively small amount paid to the attorneys by the
estate would not confer a measurable benefit on its creditors. The
court would not accede to a fee for the other lawyer which amounted
to almost $109.00 an hour, noting that in In re Beverly Crest Conva-
lescent Hospital,"3 the court had found $85.00 an hour "shocking
and grossly excessive."
In In re Lineberger,3"' the court emphasized, however, that the
"time-clock approach" is not a "meaningful and honest tool." '55 The
court instead stressed results more than time spent by the attorney
on the case. In In re Sun Fabrics, Inc., 3 the court observed that,
"the measure of reasonableness of [attorney's] fees in an arrange-
ment proceeding is largely tied to the success of the arrangement,"
and noted that, if an arrangement fails, "entirely different legal
principles . . . govern the determination of the fee allowances. 357
349. Bankruptcy Act § 64a(1), 11 U.S.C. § 104(a) (1976).
350. In re Rods & Guns, Inc., No. 76-1625 (S.D. Fla., filed Apr. 27, 1977).
351. No. 76-95 (M.D. Fla., filed Oct. 25, 1977).
352. Bankruptcy Act § 60d, 11 U.S.C. § 96(d) (1976).
353. 2 B.C.D. 1629 (9th Cir. 1976).
354. No. 76-188 (M.D. Fla., filed Apr. 4, 1978).
355. Id. slip op. at 4.
356. No. 76-728 (M.D. Fla., filed Apr. 10, 1978).
357. Id. slip op. at 4.
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The court declared that it is "uniformly recognized by all courts ' 311
that fee allowances in the arrangement proceedings are judged by
the same principles that govern attorney's fees in a straight or liqui-
dating bankruptcy proceeding.
B. Evidence of Fees
In In re Lineberger,311 the court observed that a full-blown evi-
dentiary hearing over fee arrangements is not necessary according
to American Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Braddock, 310 but that the court
can take into account its own knowledge of the case, including the
extent and value of the services performed." 1 In Lineberger, the
court also held that an hourly compensation of $77.00 was excessive
"on its face," absent extraordinary benefits produced by the serv-
ices of the attorney.
3 62
C. Fees Paid in Contemplation of Bankruptcy
It should also be noted that the jurisdictional reach of section
60(d) of the Act-which allows the bankruptcy court to reexamine
fees paid by a bankrupt to his attorney "in contemplation of" filing
a petition-can reach quite far. 33 The "in contemplation" element
is jurisdictional and is certainly not limited to instances where the
bankrupt actually meant to file bankruptcy. Rather, the jurisdic-
tional requirements of the section are satisfied when the bankrupt
"had merely in mind the possibility of filing bankruptcy at the time
he made the payment," 3" and therefore extends to services rendered
in an attempt to avoid bankruptcy. 33 It is the contemplation of the
bankrupt, and not of his attorney, that controls.
D. Dischargeability
1. FEES FOR SUCCESSFUL DISCHARGE CHALLENGE
In In re Legge,3" the bankruptcy court faced two questions: (1)
whether it could award attorney's fees to the successful litigant in
a section 17a(2) proceeding; and, if it could, (2) whether an award
358. Id.
359. No. 76-188 (M.D. Fla., filed Apr. 14, 1978).
360. 544 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1971).
361. No. 76-188, slip op. at 3.
362. Id.
363. See note 349 supra.
364. Id.
365. See, e.g., In re Nordic Enterprise, Inc., No. 74-662 (M.D. Fla., filed Oct. 12, 1977).
366. No. 77-396 (M.D. Fla., filed Nov. 15, 1977).
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of those fees would be dischargeable. Reasoning that a section 17
proceeding sounded most accurately in tort, the court held that
attorney's fees would not be proper, and that the allowance of attor-
ney's fees would be contrary to the "fresh start" purpose of the
Bankruptcy Act. The court also decided that, if awarded, the fees
would be dischargeable anyway. 37
2. DISCHARGE OF AMOUNTS OWED TO
ATTORNEY WHEN REDUCED TO JUDGMENT
In Wright v. Bailey, 38 the court held that the bankrupt's former
attorney could not avoid a discharge of the amount owed him by the
bankrupt for professional services, even though that debt had been
reduced to a state court judgment. Though the attorney even had a
promissory note from the defendant for the amounts owed, the court
declared that because the underlying nature of the note was legal
services and not property, the claim could not fall within section
17a(2), which applies only to fraudulently obtaining "property.""3 ,
367. Id. slip op. at 6. See also In re Peterson, 2 B.C.D. 215 (D.,Ore. 1976).
368. 584 F.2d 83 (5th Cir. 1978).
369. Compare Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Arenz, 290 U.S. 66 (1933).
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